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IMPLEMENTING RAPANOS-WILL JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST PROVIDE A WORKABLE
STANDARD FOR LOWER COURTS,
REGULATORS, AND DEVELOPERS?

BRADFORD C. MANKo

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook County
(HSWANCC") v. United States Army Corps of Engineers! held that the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) lacked authority under the 1972 Clean
Water Act ("CW A" or "the Act")2 to regulate wetlands and waters that serve as
habitat for migratory birds when those waters are isolated from navigable
waters. 3 The Court concluded that Congress intended that the CWA's
jurisdiction be limited to navigable waters and non-navigable waters that have a
"significant nexus" to navigable waters, including wetlands adj acent to navigable
waters. 4 SWANCC did not address the Corps' regulation of wetlands near nonnavigable tributaries that flow into navigable rivers or wetlands that are not
immediately adjacent to navigable waters but have some hydrological or
ecological connection to navigable waters. 5
After SWANCC, the federal circuit courts of appeals were divided over when
the Corps may regulate what one may call for simplicity "tributary wetlands.,,6
Six of the circuit courts of appeal limited SWANCC to its facts and allowed the
Corps to regulate tributary wetlands, or similar wetlands, if there is any
hydrological connection between them and navigable waters and sometimes
when there is only an ecological connection.? The Fifth Circuit, however,
interpreted SWANCC as limiting the Corps' jurisdiction to regulate wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters. 8 In a 2003 article, this author proposed the

* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. E-mail:
brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank the Harold C. Schott Fund for financial support.
1. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
2. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.c. 1251-1387
(2000).
3. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
4. Id. (explaining the Court's prior decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985), which requires that a "significant nexus" exist between adjacent
wetlands and navigable waters in order for the Corps to have the authority to regulate); Bradford
C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological
Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 EcoLOGY L.Q. 811, 848 (2003)
(discussing significant nexus test).
5. In Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 129, the Supreme Court held that the CWA
gives the Corps authority to regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.
6. See Mank, supra note 4, at 860-79.
7. See infra note 417 and accompanying text.
8. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[U]nder

292

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:291

intermediate position "that courts should interpret the Act to include nonnavigable waters, wetlands, or tributaries that possess a significant hydrological
connection or nexus with navigable waters.,,9 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits have recognized the significant nexus test as the key test for
determining the Act's jurisdiction, although the Ninth Circuit has concluded that
case-by-case application of that test is not required. 10
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United States, II a decision
consolidating two appeals from the Sixth Circuit: United States v. Rapanosl 2 and
Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers13 finally addressed the
question of jurisdiction over tributary wetlands or non-adjacent wetlands, but the
Court was unable to provide clear answers. 14 In Carabell, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a wetland separated by a manmade berm from a ditch that
connects through tributaries to navigable waters still qualifies for CWA
protection, even though there was only an occasional hydrological connection
between the wetland and the ditch. 15 In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit ruled that
non-navigable wetlands that are adjacent to non-navigable tributaries are subject
to CWA jurisdiction, although the only connection between wetlands at issue and
actually navigable waters is by way of twenty miles of non-navigable
tributaries. 16
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court fractured into four-to-one-to-four blocs,
although a majority of five agreed to vacate and remand the two Sixth Circuit
decisions. 17 Justice Scalia,joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas
and Alito, issued the judgment of the Court and wrote a plurality opinion that
would have sharply restricted CWA jurisdiction to only those waters that are
"relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing" or to wetlands that have
a physical surface water connection to these waters. 18 Justice Scalia relied on
dictionary definitions to discern the meaning of the statutory text. 19 The plurality
opinion is the nominal opinion of the Court because it ordered vacating and

[SWANCC], it appears that a body of water is subject to regulation under the [Act] if the body of
water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water."); see In re Needham,
354 F.3d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 2003); infra notes 346,400-03, 4l3-14 and accompanying text.
9. Mank, supra note 4, at 821-22,883-91; see also FD & P Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs,239F. Supp. 2d509, 513-17 (D.N.J. 2003) (stating thatSWANCC"has substantially altered
the meaning of '''navigable waters' in the [FWPCA and, therefore,] a 'significant nexus' must
constitute more than a mere 'hydrological connection"').
10. See infra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
11. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
12. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
13. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
14. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-27.
15. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 708-09.
16. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 643-44.
17. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219.
18. Id. at 2220-25.
19. Id. at 2220-21.
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remanding the two decisions, and as a practical matter, the plurality opinion will
not serve in most cases as precedent for lower courtS.20 Because Justice
Kennedy's concurrence disagrees with the plurality opinion in many ways, most
lower courts may treat Justice Scalia's opinion more like a dissenting opinion
than a majority opinion.21
On the other side, Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer would have upheld the Corps' broad
jurisdiction over "tributary wetlands."22 Justice Stevens emphasized the statute's
ecological purposes and the importance of deferring to the interpretation of
expert executive agencies. 23 Justice Kennedy was less deferential to the Corps'
interpretation, but his focus on the Act's ecological purposes is closer to the
dissenting opinion than it is to Justice Scalia's restrictive reading of the Act. 24
According to most, but not all, commentators, the key opinion was Justice
Kennedy's lone opinion concurring in the judgment, which joined Justice
Scalia's opinion only in vacating and remanding the two decisions. 25 Justice
Kennedy being at the center of the Court is not surprising. In a number of cases
involving federalism and national power, he has staked a position in the middle
between conservatives, who are often led by Justice Scalia, and liberals, who are
often led by Justice Stevens. 26 Kennedy concluded that the CWA's jurisdiction
reached waters and wetlands with a "significant nexus" to actually navigable
waters. 27 He balanced the CWA's broad ecological purposes against its

20. Id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Michael C. Dorf, Commentary, In the
Wetlands Case, the Supreme Court Divides Over the Clean Water Act-and Seemingly Over How
to Read Statutes as Well (June 21, 2006), http://writ.lp.findlaw.comldorf120060621.html.
21. Linda Greenhouse,lustices Divided on Protections Over Wetlands, N. Y. TIMES, June 20,
2006 ("Justice Scalia's opinion reads like a dissent.").
22. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2262-63.
24. See Dorf, supra note 20; Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.
comlmovabletype/archives/2006/06/more_on_rapanos.html (June 19,2006,13:54 ESn (quoting
William Buzbee).
25. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Regarding the Clean Water Act: Rapanos v. United
States and Carabell v. U.S. Corps of Engineers: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Environ. and
Pub. Works, 109th Congo 26 (2006) (statement of William W. Buzbee, Professor of Law, Emory
Law School), available at http://epw.senate.gov!109thlBuzbee_Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Buzbee
Statement]; Amena H. Saiyid, Lawyers Say Supreme Court Did Not Resolve Question ofAuthority
of Corps of Engineers, 37 ENVT. REp. (BNA) 1329 (June 23, 2006) (reporting that Professors
Jonathan Adler and Patrick Parentau believe Justice Kennedy's opinion will carry the most weight
with lower courts, but that attorney R. Lee Stephens argued "[i]n a plurality opinion, a clever
litigator can tum it any way."); Posting of Doug Kendall to The Blog of the American
Constitutional Law Society, http://www.acsblog.orglguest-bloggers-2907-guest-blogger-dougkendall-on-rapanos-and-federalism.html (June 20,2006, 14:45 EST).
26. Louis D. Bilionis, Grand Centrism and the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV.
1353, 1354, 1376 (2005).
27. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2241; see infra notes 156-57,232-34 and accompanying text.
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limitation of using the term "navigable waters.,,28 He explained that waters or
wetlands have this nexus if they significantly affect the ecological or
hydrological integrity of navigable waters. 29 Thus, waters or wetlands that are
not adjacent to navigable waters are protected if they have a significant impact
on actually navigable waters. 3D Waters or wetlands with a less significant
connection with actually navigable waters would not be protected. 3l Under
Kennedy's approach, lower courts will have to engage in a case-by-case analysis
to determine whether a significant nexus links wetlands to navigable waters. 32
Because he asserted that the Corps and lower courts may consider broad
ecological connections among wetlands and navigable waters in determining
whether there is a significant nexus between them, Justice Kennedy's opinion
suggests that the Corps will be able to regulate many of the "tributary wetlands"
that it had asserted jurisdiction over before the Rapanos decision. 33
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test has both the advantages and
disadvantages of comprehensiveness. His approach looks at both the physical
hydrological connection between wetlands and navigable waters as well as
broader ecological connections. 34 A test limited to the physical hydrological
connections would have been easier to apply.35 By requiring consideration of
ecological connections, he places a much heavier burden on the Corps and lower
courts to examine complex biological relationships between wetlands and
navigable waters. His test in most cases will produce the same result as Justice
Stevens in his dissenting opinion. 36 It would have been easier if Justice Kennedy
had simply joined the dissenting opinion. 37 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy likely
felt constrained by his vote with the SWANCC majority opinion not to join the
Rapanos dissenting opinion. 38 Justice Kennedy had to remain true to SWANCC's
underlying principle that the Act is limited to waters that have some meaningful
connection to navigable waters. 39
There is disagreement about which opinions in Rapanos are binding on lower
courts. Chief Justice Roberts in his solo concurring opinion mentioned the rule
in Marks v. United States,40 which held that when the Supreme Court issues a
fragmented decision, those members who concur "on the narrowest grounds"

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-49; see infra notes 269, 275 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 254, 268-69 and accompanying text.
Set' infra note 255 and accompanying text.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249; see infra note 277 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 157,217-20,329-31,360,488 and accompanying text.
See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 354-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 363, 464 and accompanying text.
See infra note 363 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 232-33, 241 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 234, 243-45, 266 and accompanying text.
430 U.S. 188,193-94 (1977).
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have the controlling opinion.41 He did not address which opinion would control
the lower courtS. 42 Justice Stevens's dissent stated that because the four
dissenting votes agreed that the government's broad regulation of tributary
wetlands was valid the government should have jurisdiction over tributary
wetlands if the wetlands at issue meet either the plurality's test or Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus standard because there would be a working majority
of at least five votes, including dissenting votes. 43 Professor Adler has
interpreted the Marks decision to require lower courts to follow those portions
of the Rapanos decision where the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy agree
and to forbid lower courts from considering the dissenting opinion.44 Professor
Buzbee, by contrast, argues that Marks allows lower courts to consider the
numerous points upon which the dissenting opinion and Justice Kennedy's
opinion form a five vote majority.45 In its Motion for Remand in the Rapanos
case, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") cited Marks in agreeing with Justice
Stevens's dual approach that the government should have jurisdiction over
wetlands if the wetlands at issue meet either the plurality's test or Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" standard. 46
The first lower court decision decided after Rapanos did not follow Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test. In United States v. Chevron Pipe Line CO.,47
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 28, 2006
criticized the significant nexus test in Justice Kennedy's Rapanos concurrence
as too vague and subjective to provide guidance. Instead the court followed the
Fifth Circuit's prior precedent that had narrowly construed the Act in an
approach closer to the plurality opinion. 48 In August 2006, however, the Ninth
Circuit in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg49 followed
Justice Kennedy's test. 50 In September 2006, the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. 51 stated that Justice Kennedy's test should be
followed except in the rare case when the plurality'S approach would give greater
federal jurisdiction under the CWA. 52 Four other circuits are also likely to follow
the significant nexus test based on their prior pre-Rapanos precedent. 53
On remand, the Sixth Circuit and its district courts are likely to apply Justice

41. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 457 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 461-64 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 441-42 and accompanying text.
47. 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
48. Id. at 613.
49. 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
50. Id. at 1029-30.
51. 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to apply Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test to the facts of the case. Id. at 725.
52. Id.
53. See infra note 417 and accompanying text.
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Kennedy's significant nexus test in determining whether the government has
proven a sufficient connection between the wetlands on Rapanos and Carabell' s
properties and navigable waters. 54 Justice Kennedy suggested that there may be
sufficient evidence of such a nexus for the government to win both cases. He
also implied that the final result after the remand would likely be closer to
Stevens's dissenting opinion than the plurality opinion. 55
The Corps and EPA (the "Agencies") have promised to issue new joint
guidance in the near future to address the scope of the Act in the wake of
Rapanos, but it is unclear whether the Agencies will issue detailed regulations
in this area. After the SWANCC decision, in 2001, the Agencies had announced
their intention of issuing new wetlands rules. In 2003, however, the Agencies
abandoned their attempt to develop new wetlands regulations. 56 There are
serious disagreements between developers and conservationists about the scope
of the Act and those disagreements remain a serious obstacle to the agencies
developing new regulations. 57 Yet Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test could
provide a workable framework for new regulations, and thus, there is a better
opportunity after Rapanos for the agencies to develop new regulations. 58
Section II will provide a brief history of federal regulation of "navigable
waters," the passage of the Act, the Corps' regulations, the SWANCC decision,
and the agencies' failure to issue new regulations. Section ill will analyze the
main Rapanos opinions of Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy,
as well as the briefer opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer.
Section N will examine the Texas District Court decision, the likely response in
other Circuits, and how quickly the Corps is likely to issue new wetlands
regulations.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS AND WETLANDS

A. Regulation of Navigable Waters
The Constitution does not expressly authorize federal regulation of
navigation, but Congress' authority over navigation has long been recognized
through its authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. ,,59 In 1824, Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden60 held that Congress had authority under
the Commerce Clause to license steamboat operations in New York waters
because Congress had the implied power to regulate navigation to facilitate its

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See infra notes 284-92, 417 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 312, 387-88, 464 and accompanying text.
See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276, 436, 489 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3; Mank, supra note 4, at 824.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
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authority over interstate commerce. 61 During the nineteenth century, the Court
limited federal authority over navigable waters to waters that were navigable in
fact. 62 In 1871, the Court in The Daniel Balr3 defined navigable waters of the
United States as those interstate waters that are "navigable in fact" or readily
susceptible of being rendered SO.64
Beginning in 1937, courts broadened their interpretation of Congress's
authority over interstate commerce, which in turn led courts to expand the federal
navigation power as well. 65 In its 1940 decision United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power CO.,66 the Supreme Court broadened the definition of navigable
waters to include those susceptible to navigation with "reasonable
improvement.,,67 More importantly, the Court recognized that Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate non-navigable waters that have
significant effects on interstate Commerce.
[I]t cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United
States over its waters is limited to control for navigation .... In truth the
authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its
waters. Navigability ... is but a part of this whole. Flood protection,
watershed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through
utilization of power are likewise parts of commerce control. ... [The]
authority is as broad as the needs of commerce. . . . The point is that
navigable waters are subject to national planning and control in the
broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal Government. 68
After the Appalachian Power decision, courts gradually expanded the range
of circumstances in which the federal government has authority over nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters. 69 In the 1965 decision Federal Power
Commission v. Union Electric Co.,1° the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Power Commission's authority over power-generation facilities extended to nonnavigable waters as well, determining that the Commerce Clause applies to nonnavigable waters. 71
In the 1979 decision Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 72 Justice Rehnquist stated
that Congress can regulate non-navigable waters under the Commerce Clause.73

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

[d.; Mank, supra note 4, at 824.
Mank, supra note 4, at 826.
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
/d. at 563; United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2216 (2006).
Mank, supra note 4, at 828-30.
311 U.S. 377 (1940).
[d. at 408-09.
/d. at 426-27.
Mank, supra note 4, at 829-30.
381 U.S. 90 (1965).
[d. at 97-110; Mank, supra note 4, at 830.
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
/d. at 174; Mank, supra note 4, at 832-33.
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He observed that the "navigability of a waterway adds little if anything to the
breadth of Congress' regulatory power over interstate commerce.,,74 Instead,
Justice Rehnquist focused on the effect waters or other economic activities have
on interstate commerce. 75 In particular, he found that economic activities that
affect interstate commerce "are susceptible of congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is
involved."76 A key issue is whether Congress in the CWA intended to reach the
furthest limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause.
B. The 1972 Clean Water Act

In the 1972 CWA, Congress adopted a comprehensive approach to regulating
pollution and improving the quality of the nation's waters. 77 The statute's goal
is the "[r]estoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological
integrity of Nation's waters" for current and future generations. 7s Section 404
of the Act protects wetlands by requiring all persons to obtain a permit from the
Corps "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites.,,79 The Corps plays the primary role in issuing Section
404 permits, but the EPA has authority to veto a Corps' permit or an approved
State or Tribe permit, although the EPA's exercise of its veto authority is rare. so
The Act delineates its jurisdiction to include navigable waters, which the Act
then defines as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."Sl
The joint House-Senate Conference Report for the Act explained that "the
conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations
which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes."S2 In its

74. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 173.
75. Mank, supra note 4, at 832-33.
76. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
77. Mank, supra note 4, at 831.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
79. [d. § 1344(a).
80. [d. § 1344(c) (''The [EPA] Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification ...
of any defined area as a disposal site ... whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for
public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning
and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."); see also James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d
1330 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding EPA's veto under § 404(c) of Corps § 404(b) permit); Mank,
supra note 4, at 814 n.6; Lance D. Wood, Section 404: Federal Wetland Regulation Is Essential,
7 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T 7 (1992) (observing that the EPA rarely uses its veto power over
Corps wetlands permits).
81. 33 U.S.c. § 1362(7) (2000).
82. S. REp. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), as reprinted in A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 327 (1973).
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1974 decision United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation CO.,83 the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the Conference Report's language to mean that Congress
intended that the Act reach all waters that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 84 Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have continued to
argue that Congress in the 1972 Act intended the term "waters of the United
States" to include only actually or potentially navigable waters. 85
A number of provisions in the 1972 CWA suggest Congress intended to
regulate some non-navigable waters. 86 Although some sections of the CWA refer
specifically to navigable waters,87 the statute defines the term to include the
waters of the United States without any further reference to navigability.88 The
House Bill for the 1972 Act had defined navigable waters as the "navigable
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,,,89 but the final
Conference Bill eliminated the word navigable. 90 The EPA and the Corps have
each argued that this deletion is strong evidence that Congress intended to
expand the Act's definition beyond navigable waters. 91 Additionally, other
sections of the Act go beyond interstate navigable waters to include "intrastate
waters,,92 and "any waters.,,93
Some commentators, however, argue that the Conference Report for the Act
demonstrates that Congress intended to require only the broadest constitutional
authority over traditional navigable waters. 94 In SWANCC, the government
acknowledged that it was "somewhat ambiguous" whether the conferees'
language sought to reach the broadest possible limits of navigability or of the

83. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 1325; see also Philip Weinberg, It's Time For Congress to Rearm the Army Corps
of Engineers: A Response to the Solid Waste Agency Decision, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 535 (200 I)
(maintaining Congress intended in 1972 Act to employ its full authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate both navigable and non-navigable waters).
85. Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New
Look at the Legislative History ofthe Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. REp. 11042, 11046-49 (2002)
(contending that Congress in the 1972 Act sought only to regulate potentially navigable waters).
86. Mank, supra note 4, at 831-32.
87. 33 U.S.c. § 1344 (2000).
88. See, e.g., 33 U.S.c. § 1312(a) (establishing water quality-related effluent limitations for
"navigable waters"); see also id. § 1362(7); Mank, supra note 4, at 831-32; Weinberg, supra note
84, at 535.
89. H.R. II 896, 92nd Congo 502(8)(1972).
90. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11047; Mank, supra note 4, at 832.
91. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 1I047; Mank, supra note 4, at 832.
92. 33 U.S.c. § 1313(a)(2) (2000) (stating EPA must approve state water quality standards
for intrastate waters); Mank, supra note 4, at 832; Weinberg, supra note 84, at 535.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (2000) (stating that EPA effluent limitations for toxic pollutants
"shall take into account the ... presence of the affected organisms in any waters"); Mank, supra
note 4, at 832; Weinberg, supra note 84, at 535.
94. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11047; Mank, supra note 4, at 833.
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Commerce Clause. 95 In light of Congress's concern during the early 1970s that
the Corps failed to interpret its authority under the 1899 River and Harbor Act96
to the fullest possible limits of navigable waters, some commentators contend
that Congress more likely intended the 1972 Act only to reach all actually or
potentially navigable waters rather than whatever non-navigable waters Congress
might be able to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 97
C. The Corps Wetlands Regulations

1. The EPA and the Corps Initially Disagreed About the Act's
lurisdiction.-From 1972 until 1975, the EPA and the Corps disagreed about the
scope of the Act's jurisdiction.98 In 1973, the EPA's general counsel issued an
opinion stating that the "the deletion of the word 'navigable' [in the 1972 Act]
eliminates the requirement of navigability. The only remaining requirement,
then, is that pollution of waters covered by the bill must be capable of affecting
interstate comrnerce."99 In May 1973, the EPA promulgated regulations defining
navigable waters requiring a CWA permit to include several types of nonnavigable waters. 100
The Corps, by contrast, defined the CWA's jurisdiction as only "the broadest
possible definition of actually and potentially navigable waters."IOI In a 1974
rule addressing its jurisdiction under Section 404 of the Act, the Corps construed
the 1972 FWPCA Conference Report's statement that the Act should be
interpreted according to "the broadest possible constitutional interpretation,
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made
for administrative purposes" to refer to prior judicial precedents addressing the
constitutional limits of actually or potentially navigable waters. 102 The Corps'

95. Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531
U.S. 157, 168 n.3 (2001) (citing Brief for Federal Respondents at 24); Mank, supra note 4, at 833.
96. River and Harbor Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.c.
§ 401 (2000»; Mank, supra note 4, at 827-28.
97. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11047; Mank, supra note 4, at 833.
98. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11049-50; Mank, supra note 4, at 833-34.
99. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 1049 (quoting EPA General Counsel Opinion
(Feb. 6,1973».
100. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,528-29 (May
22, 1973); Mank, supra note 4, at 833-34. The regulation defined CWAjurisdiction to include:
(1) All navigable waters of the United States; (2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the
United States; (3) Interstate waters; (4) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are
utilized by interstate travelers for recreational or other purposes; (5) Intrastate lakes,
rivers, and streams from which fish or shellfish are taken and sold in interstate
commerce; (6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for industrial
purposes by industries in interstate commerce.
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. at 13,529.
101. Mank, supra note 4, at 834 (citing Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11050).
102. [d. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 209. 120(d)(1) (1974».
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1974 regulations defined "navigable waters" as "those waters of the United
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or
have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of
interstate or foreign commerce.,,103
2. The Corps' 19751nterim and 1977 Final Regulations Expand the CWA's
Jurisdiction.-"In the 1975 decision Natural Resources Defense Council[, Inc.}
v. Callaway, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the Corps' definition of 'navigable waters' was unduly limited and violated
the FWPCA."I04 ''The court concluded that Congress 'asserted federal
jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution .... 105 Accordingly, "the term [navigable
waters] is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability." 106
In response to the Callaway decision's order requiring it to issue new
regulations,lo7 the Corps issued interim regulations in 1975 that defined
"navigable waters" to include intrastate lakes, rivers and streams that are used by
interstate travelers or in interstate commerce; non-navigable tributaries; and
"intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not
contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters.,,108 In 1977, the Corps issued a final
rule that included all of the categories of waters in the interim rule and also
included isolated wetlands and waters whose degradation or destruction could
affect interstate commerce. I09 In the 1977 amendments to the Act, Congress
considered bills that would have clarified the definition of navigable waters in
the statute or the scope of the Act's jurisdiction, but it failed to pass any of these
amendments. I10

D. Riverside Bayview: Providing Supportfor Broader Agency Jurisdiction
"In the 1985 decision United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that the Corps had jurisdiction over non-navigable wetlands
that are adjacent to navigable waters because they are 'waters of the United
States' as defined by the Act." II I The Court concluded that the agencies'
regulation of "any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasonable

103. [d.

104. Mank, supra note 4, at 834 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.
Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975».
105. [d. (quoting Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686).
106. [d.
107. See Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.

108. Pennits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320,
31,324-25 (July 25, 1975); see also Mank, supra note 4, at 835.
109. See Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July
19, 1977); see also Mank, supra note 4, at 835.
110. See Mank, supra note 4, at 836.
111. [d. at 837-40 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,131
(1985».
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proximity to other waters of the United States" was valid under the Act. I 12 The
wetlands at issue were adjacent to and partly abutted a navigable creek. I 13 "The
Riverside Bayview Court concluded that the term 'navigable' is of 'limited
import' and that Congress sought 'to exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable"
under the classical understanding of thatterm. '" 114 Based on the Act's goals and
legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress sought to regulate some
non-navigable waters, especially waters such as adjacent wetlands that often have
substantial hydrological or ecological impacts on navigable waters. 115
"The Riverside Bayview Court emphasized the importance of hydrological
and biological interactions between adjacent wetlands and navigable waters in
determining that adjacent wetlands are within the scope of the Act." 116 The Court
conceded that some adjacent wetlands might not have significant hydrological
and ecological relationships with navigable waters, but determined that the
Corps' regulation was valid because substantial interactions exist for most
adjacent wetlands. 1I7 "The Court emphasized that the agencies' 'technical
expertise' and 'ecological judgment' in determining the relationship 'between
waters and their adjacent wetlands provide[] an adequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands' are covered by the ACt.,,1I8 Additionally, the
Court concluded that the Corps had jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands because
there was evidence that Congress, in enacting the 1977 Amendments to the Act,
had acquiesced to the Corps' regulations applying the Act to adjacent wetlands
because even an unsuccessful bill that proposed to limit the Corps' jurisdiction
to traditional navigable waters had not sought to exclude the Corps' regulation
of wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 1I9
E. SWANCC
In the 2001 SWANCC decision, the Court invalidated the Corps' 1986
Migratory Bird "Rule,"120 which sought to regulate all wetlands and waters that

112. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134 (quoting Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977».
113. [d. at 135.
114. Mank, supra note 4, at 838 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133).
115. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129-35; see also Mank, supra note 4, at 837-38.
116. Mank, supra note 4, at 840 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-35).
117. RiversideBayview, 474 U.S. at 135 n.9; see also Mank, supra note 4, at 840.
118. Mank, supra note 4, at 838 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134).
119. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136-39; see also Mank, supra note 4, at 839.
120. The so-called Migratory Bird "Rule" was contained in the preamble of 1986 Corps
regulations interpreting the scope of the Corps existing wetland regulations. See Final Rule for
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986)
(interpreting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2005»; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 85, at 11042 n.2,
11052; Mank, supra note 4, at 842-43. In 1988, the EPA included the same Migratory Bird "Rule"
in the preamble of one its regulations. See Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and
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serve as habitat for migratory birds because the Corps exceeded the Act's
jurisdiction in attempting to regulate waters "isolated" from navigable waters. 121
The Court concluded that Congress intended that the Act's jurisdiction be limited
to navigable waters and non-navigable waters that have a "significant nexus" to
navigable waters, including wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 122 Although
the Riverside Bayview decision had stated that navigability was of limited import
in determining the Act's scope, the SWANCC Court stated that the relationship
of waters to navigability was still an important factor in determining whether
particular waters were within the Act's jurisdiction,
it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it
no effect whatever. The term 'navigable' has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
[Act]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been
navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made. 123
Based on its reading of the statute's text, the Court concluded that the term
"navigable waters" did not encompass "isolated" wetlands or waters because
navigability is a central factor in determining the Act's jurisdiction. 124 As
support for its "navigability" interpretation, the Court observed that the Corps'
original 1974 interpretation of the Act has defined the Act's jurisdiction as
waters that are potentially navigable. 125 The Court rejected the government's
argument that even if the 1972 Congress had intended to cover only navigable
waters that Congress in enacting the 1977 Amendments had acquiesced in the
Corps' broader regulatory definition in the 1977 regulations or the subsequent
1986 Migratory Bird "Rule."126
Although it did not actually decide whether Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate isolated waters, the Court stated that one reason
that it refused to defer to the government's interpretation of the Act in the
Migratory Bird "Rule" was due to its serious doubts about whether the regulation
was within the scope of the congressional commerce power. 127 "The SWANCC
Court rejected the government's argument that the Corps' interpretation was
entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine, which states that courts should
usually defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute for
which Congress has delegated authority to the agency.,,128 The Court concluded

Permit Exemptions; Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764,20,764-65 (June
6, 1988).
121. Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S.
157,171-72 (2001).
122. See id. at 167-68; see also Mank, supra note 4, at 847-48.
123. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
124. Id. at 167-68; Mank, supra note 4, at 846-54.
125. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168; see also Mank, supra note 4, at 852-53.
126. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168-71; see Mank, supra note 4, at 848-49.
127. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-74; Mank, supra note 4, at 849-52.
128. SeeSWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74; Mank, supra note 4, at 841; see also Chevron U.S.A.,
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that "we find 404(a) to be clear" and, "even were we to agree with respondents
[that the statute is ambiguous], we would not extend Chevron deference here.,,129
''The Court applies an exception to the [Chevron] doctrine when an agency's
interpretation raises serious constitutional questions; the Court places the burden
of proof on the agency to demonstrate that Congress intended a statute to reach
the broadest limits of congressional authority under the Constitution.,,'3o The
Court stated, "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the
outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.,,'31 Additionally, the Court observed, "This concern is
heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power,"
in this case local regulation of land use. 132 The Court did not find any "clear
indication" that Congress intended the Act to regulate isolated waters, stating
"[t]hese are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents'
application of their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear
statement from Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand
and gravel pit such as we have here.,,'33 Accordingly, the SWANCC majority
rej ected the government's broad interpretation of the Act to include isolated
waters. "We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference.,,'34
The voting of the Court's justices in SWANCC had important implications
for the vote in Rapanos. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the SWANCC majority
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. 135 Chief
Justice Rehnquist died and Justice O'Connor retired before the Rapanos
decision. They were replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. As
Part ill will discuss, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, disagreed about the implications of SWANCC when they addressed the
different facts in Rapanos. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissented. '36 These same four Justices also dissented in Rapanos.

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984) (holding that courts should
defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute for which Congress has delegated authority if the
statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is permissible, or, in other words, reasonable).
129. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174; see Mank, supra note 4, at 851.
130. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988); Mank, supra note 4, at 851-52
n.256.
131. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172; see Mank, supra note 4, at 850-52.
132. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173; see Mank, supra note 4, at 850-52.
133. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174; see Mank, supra note 4, at 850-52.
134. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
135. [d. at 161.
136. [d. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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F. The EPA's and the Corps' 2001 Joint Memorandum on SWANCC
and 2003 Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making
On January 19, 2001, the last full day of the Clinton administration, the
Agencies issued ajoint memorandum written by Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel
of the EPA, and Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel of the Corps, adopting the
narrow interpretation that SWANCC limited the agencies' regulatory authority
only over waters in which their jurisdiction was based solely on the presence of
migratory birds. 137 The 2001 joint memorandum took a broad interpretation of
which waters are within the Act's jurisdiction after the SWANCC decision.138
The memorandum stated that SWANCC had not overruled the holding or
rationale of Riverside Bayview, which the memorandum claimed had "upheld the
regulation of traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, their tributaries and
wetlands adjacent to each.,,139 Additionally, the memorandum contended that
even "waters that are isolated, intrastate, and nonnavigable," may still be within
the Act's jurisdiction "if their use, degradation, or destruction could affect other
'waters of the United States,' thus establishing a significant nexus between the
water in question and other 'waters of the United States.",140 The joint
memorandum's use of the tenn significant nexus test was clearly based on its use
in SWANCc. 141
On January 15,2003, during President George W. Bush's Administration, the
EPA and the Corps published in the Federal Register an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) to solicit public comment for forty-five days
to clarify the extent of the Act's jurisdiction in light of SWANCc. 142 The
Agencies also issued a new joint memorandum, or guidance attached as
Appendix A to the ANPRM, which superseded the 2001 joint memorandum, on
how field staff should address jurisdictional issues until the agencies issue a final
rule on the subject. 143 The most significant change in the revised 2003 joint
memorandum from its 2001 predecessor is that field staff must receive "fonnal
project-specific [] approval" from agency headquarters before claiming
jurisdiction over any isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters. l44 "Because
SWANCC did not directly address tributaries, the Corps notified its field staff

137. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, and Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2-3 (Jan. 19,
2001) [hereinafter 2001 Joint Memorandum], available at http://www.aswm.orglfwp/swancc/legal.
pdf; see Mank, supra note 4, at 858-60.
138. Mank, supra note 4, at 859.
139. 2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 137, at 2; see Mank, supra note 4, at 859.
140. 2001 Joint Memorandum, supra note 137, at 3; Mank, supra note 4, at 859.
141. Mank, supra note 4, at 859.
142. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition
of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1991-92 (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter
ANPRM]; Mank, supra note 4, at 879-80.
143. ANPRM, supra note 142, at 1995-98; see Mank, supra note 4, at 880-83.
144. ANPRM, supra note 142, at 1997-98; see Mank, supra note 4, at 881-83.
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that they 'should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable
waters . . . and, generally speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent
wetlands). ",145 Additionally, "because SWANCC did not overrule Riverside
Bayview, the Corps continued to assert jurisdiction over waters '"neighboring'''
traditional navigable waters and their tributaries."I46
After receiving over 30,000 comments, the agencies subsequently extended
the comment period to April 16, 2003. 147 In December 2003, the Agencies
announced that they would not issue new regulations significantly restricting
their jurisdiction over wetlands, but instead would keep the January 2003 joint
guidance in effect until issuing revised guidance defining the Act's
jurisdiction. 148 According to Justice Stevens, "almost all of the 43 States to
submit comments opposed any significant narrowing of the Corps'
jurisdiction-as did roughly 99% of the 133,000 other comment submitters.,,149
Some commentators have speculated that the Agencies may have decided not to
issue regulations because there were strongly conflicting views between
developers and conservationists, including hunters and fishers, about the scope
of the Act's jurisdiction. 150
II. RAPANOS

The fundamental underlying difference among the three main opinions in
Rapanos was between the textualist method of statutory interpretation used by
Justice Scalia and the purposivist approaches of Justices Kennedy and Stevens. 151
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion focused on the meaning ofthe statute's text in
light of the common meaning of words in a dictionary.152 He peremptorily
assumed that he could find the Act's meaning by simply using a dictionary and
dismissed the possibility that the text was ambiguous enough to justify the Corps'
interpretation. 153
Justices Kennedy and Stevens focused on the Act's underlying purposes,

145. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2217 (2006) (quoting ANPRM, supra note 142, at 1998).
146. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting ANPRM, supra note 142, at 1997 (citation
omitted».
147. Advance Notice of Proposed Ru1emaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition
of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 9613, 9613 (Feb. 28, 2003); Ray A. Smith, New
Guidelines Stir Debate on Wetlands, W ALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at B8 (reporting agencies received
over 30,000 comments regarding ANPRM).
148. Press Release, EPA, EPA and Army Corps Issue Wetlands Decision (Dec. 16,2003), at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opaladmpress.nsflb 1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/540f28acf38d
7f9b85256dfe00714abO?OpenDocument; Mank, supra note 4, at 883.
149. United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2256 n.4 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Matt Shipman, Old Dispute Hampers New Administration Bid to Settle Water Act Scope,
INSIDE THE EPA, June 23,2006, available at 2006 WL 10765163.
151. Dorf, supra note 20.
152. See infra notes 164-67,364 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
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agreed that the plurality's interpretation was flawed, but the two Justices
disagreed as to what extent the statute was ambiguous and the amount of
deference due to the Corps. 154 In light of the Act's broad purposes and Congress'
intent to give the Corps wide discretion to achieve those purposes, Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion argued that the Corps' wetlands regulations were
justified in claiming jurisdiction over all tributary wetlands. 155 By contrast,
Justice Kennedy argued that the Act's use of the term "navigable waters" limited
its jurisdictional scope to waters having a "significant nexus" to navigable waters
and that the Corps regulations were deficient because they did not demonstrate
the existence of such a nexus for all the wetlands that it regulated. 156 His broad
interpretation of the term "significant nexus" in light of the Act's broad
ecological purposes, however, raises a significant possibility that the Corps could
justify most of its existing regulation of tributary wetlands. 157 Justice Kennedy's
overall approach was closer to Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion because they
both focused on the statute's purposes more than its ambiguous text, although
there are clearly some important differences between the two opinions.

A. Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, but lower courts will
more likely follow Justice Kennedy's opinion rather than the plurality opinion. 158
At the beginning of the opinion, the plurality criticized "the immense expansion
of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water
Act-without any change in the governing statute," described the Corps as an
"enlightened despot," deplored the delays and expense of the permit process, and
observed that "Mr. Rapanos faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of
thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines.,,159 Justice Scalia complained
that the Corps' expansive definition gave it jurisdiction over almost any
significant land area that contained an intermittent conduit, stating, "[b]ecause
they include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the statutory
'waters of the United States' engulf entire cities and immense arid
wastelands."I60 A cynical observer would argue that the plurality's distaste for
the results of the Corps' policies could have easily influenced their narrow
interpretation of the Act's language.
Although rejecting the Rapanos petitioners' argument that the terms
"navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" in the Act are "limited to
the traditional definition of [navigability in] The Daniel Ball," Justice Scalia

154. See infra notes 264-69, 387-88 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2252 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
156. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236; see also infra notes 263-76 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 217-20, 329-31, 360, 488 and accompanying text.
158. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 & n.14 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. ld. at 2214-15 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
160. ld. at 2215.
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observed that the SWANCC Court made clear that the "qualifier 'navigable' is not
devoid of significance."161 He maintained that the Court did not need to "decide
the precise extent to which the qualifiers 'navigable' and 'of the United States'
restrict the coverage of the Act" because "[w]hatever the scope of these
qualifiers, the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over 'waters.",162
Justice Scalia reasoned that the "Corps' expansive approach might be arguable
if the CSA [sic] defined 'navigable waters' as 'water of the United States. "'163
Justice Scalia focused on the meaning of the statute's text in light of the
common meaning of words in dictionaries. He argued that the Act's "use of the
definite article ('the') and the plural number ('waters') show plainly that §
1362(7) does not refer to water in general." 164 Instead, relying on and quoting the
1954 second edition of Webster's New International Dictionary ("Webster's
Second"), he maintained that '''the waters' refers more narrowly to water '[a]s
found in streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers,
[and] lakes,' or 'the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up
such streams or bodies.''' 165
Additionally, Justice Scalia observed that the Webster's Second definition
"refers to water as found in 'streams,' 'oceans,' 'rivers,' 'lakes,' and 'bodies' of
water 'forming geographical features. ",166 He reasoned that "[a]ll of these terms
connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry
channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flOWS.,,167 Justice
Scalia conceded that the term might include rivers that "dry up in extraordinary
circumstances, such as drought" or seasonal rivers.168 He rejected Justice
Kennedy's observation that Webster's Second includes an alternative definition
of waters because it was "wholly unreasonable to interpret the statute as
regulating only 'floods' and 'inundations' rather than traditional waterways.,,169
Implicitly, Justice Scalia rejected the possibility that waters could include both
permanent waterways and intermittent streams caused by rainfall or flooding.
Justice Scalia recognized that his interpretation of the Act's jurisdiction to
include only relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water would exclude many channels that the Corps has regulated for over thirty
years. Under his interpretation of the statute, the Corps had over-regulated far
too many areas that are essentially dry land. Justice Scalia asserted, "[i]n
applying the definition to 'ephemeral streams,' 'wet meadows,' storm sewers and

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

[d. at 2220.
[d. (quoting 33 U.S.c. § 1362(7) (2000)).
[d.
[d.
[d. at 2220-21 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY 2882 (2d ed.

1954)).
166. [d. at 2221 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONALDICfIONARY, supra note 165, at

2882).
167. [d.
168. [d. at 2221 n.5.
169. [d. at 2221 n.4.
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culverts, 'directional sheet flow during storm events,' drain tiles, man-made
drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps has
stretched the term 'waters of the United States' beyond parody." 170
Additionally, Justice Scalia reasoned that "the Act's use of the traditional
phrase 'navigable waters' ... further confirms that it confers jurisdiction only
over relatively pennanent bodies of water." 171 He observed that traditionally the
term "navigable waters" was understood to include "only discrete bodies of
water," and that SWANCC recognized that the term "carries some of its original
substance."172 Justice Scalia also noted that the Riverside Bayview Court had
described "the waters of the United States" as "referr[ing] primarily to 'rivers,
streams, and other hydrographic features, '" all of which in his view referred to
permanent bodies of water. 173
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued "the CWA itself categorizes the channels
and conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from
'navigable waters,' by including them in the definition of 'point source.''' 174 He
observed that the definition of point source includes, but is not limited to, "any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit ... from which pollutants are or may be
discharged."175 He claimed that it made more sense to treat "'point sources'" and
"'navigable waters'" as separate and distinct categories because the "definition
of 'discharge' would make little sense if the two categories were significantly
overlapping.,,176 Justice Scalia reasoned that the "separate classification of
'ditch[es], channel[s], and conduit[s], -which are terms ordinarily used to
describe the watercourses through which intennittent waters typically
flow-shows that these are, by and large, not 'waters of the United States.",m
Next, Justice Scalia argued that only his narrow interpretation of the term
"'waters' is consistent with CWA's stated 'policy ... to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States ... to plan the
development and use ... of land and water resources.'" 178 Thus, he reasoned
that "[e]ven if the phrase 'the waters of the United States' were ambiguous as
applied to intermittent flows, our own canons of construction would establish
that the Corps' interpretation of the statute is impermissible.,,'79 Justice Scalia
observed that SWANCC had rejected the Corps broad interpretation of its
jurisdiction, in part, because the term "the waters of the United States" did not

170. [d. at 2222.
171. [d.
172. [d.
173. [d. (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985»

(emphasis added by Justice Scalia).
174. [d. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000».
175. [d. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000».
176. [d. at 2223.
177. [d. (emphasis in original).
178. [d. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000».
179. [d. at 2224; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (deferring to agency interpretation of a statute only if the interpretation is permissible).
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support the Corps' "unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority" or
authorize federal action that "stretches the outer limits of Congress's commerce
power" without far more explicit statutory authorization from Congress. 180 He
concluded that "on its only plausible interpretation, the phrase 'the waters of the
United States' includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water.... The phrase does not include channels through which
water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage for rainfall." 181 One must question Justice Scalia's assurance that his
is the only plausible interpretation when five other justices disagreed and most
lower court decisions had interpreted the Act more broadly. 182
Justice Scalia concluded that it is "only those wetlands with a continuous
surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between the 'waters' and wetlands, are
'adjacent to' such waters and covered by the ACt.,,183 This continuous surface
connection requirement invalidates the approach used by many lower courts and
the Corps on numerous occasions to allow regulation of wetlands that have a
hydrological or ecological connection to navigable waters. Justice Scalia
observed that the Sixth Circuit in Rapanos had "stated that, even if the ditches
were not 'waters of the United States,' the wetlands were 'adjacent' to remote
traditional navigable waters in virtue of the wetlands' 'hydrological connection'
to them.,,184 He noted that many Corps' district offices had adopted the
hydrological connection approach.185 Justice Scalia argued that a wetland may
not be considered "adjacent to" remote "waters of the United States" based on
a mere hydrologic connection. 186 He characterized the Riverside Bayview Court's
deference to the Corps inclusion of adjacent wetlands as "waters of the United
States" as justified by the inherent ambiguity in defining the boundaries where
the "water" ends and its abutting or "adjacent" wetlands begin. 187 Justice Scalia
maintained that the Riverside Bayview Court allowed the Corps to rely on
ecological considerations only to resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all
abutting wetlands as waters. 188 He contended that his interpretation of Riverside
Bayview was supported by the fact that the SWANCC Court did not allow the
Corps to consider ecological factors in determining their jurisdiction over
isolated waters because there was no boundary-drawing problem justifying the

180. [d. ~citing Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Anny Corps of Eng' rs.
531 U.S. 159 (2001».
181. [d. at 2225.
182. See infra notes 206-08. 247-50. 417 and accompanying text.
183. Rapanos. 126 S. Ct. at 2226 (emphasis in original).
184. [d. at 2225 (quoting United States v. Rapanos. 376 F.3d 629. 639-40 (6th Cir. 2004).
vacated and remanded; 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006» (emphasis added by Justice Scalia).
185. [d.
186. [d. at 2225-27.
187. [d. at 2225-26.
188. [d.
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invocation of those factors.189
Although not an issue before the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the argument
of the government and many amici that restricting the definition of navigable
waters would "frustrate enforcement against traditional water polluters" by
allowing them to pollute intermittent streams that would no longer be within the
Act's jurisdiction under the plurality opinion. 190
Although under his
interpretation of the Act intermittent streams or channels would no longer be
navigable waters, he maintained that such channels would still be point sources
under Section 402 of the Act, and therefore, polluters who dumped into nonnavigable channels would still be liable if any pollution flowed downstream into
navigable waters. 191 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the issue of point source
pollution was not before the Court, but he felt compelled to address the issue
because he needed to respond to the assertion that his narrow definition of
"waters of the United States" must be wrong if it effectively gutted enforcement
against water polluters. He suggested in dicta that the hydrological connection
approach used by the Sixth Circuit might well be appropriate in determining the
responsibility of point sources for downstream pollution into waters of the United
States, but maintained that the hydrological connection approach was not
appropriate to the different problem of placing immobile fill into wetlands under
separate § 404 wetlands program. 192
Because the Sixth Circuit applied an incorrect standard to determine whether
the wetlands at issue are covered "waters," and because of the "paucity of the
record," the plurality, joined by Justice Kennedy's fifth vote, vacated the
judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the cases for further proceedings. 193
According to the plurality opinion, the lower courts on remand could find in
favor of the Corps having jurisdiction over the Rapanos and Carabell sites only
by finding that the adj acent channel contains a relatively permanent "water of the
United States," and that each wetland "has a continuous surface connection with
that water, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the
'wetland' begins.,,194 The Corps would likely lose both cases under this two-part
test.

189. Id. at 2226.
190. Id. at 2227.
191. Id. (discussing CWA § 301, 33 V.S.c. § 1311(a) (2000) (prohibiting discharge of any
pollutant except in compliance with other provisions of Act); CWA § 402, 33 V.S.C. § 1342 (2000)
(requiring permit before anyone may discharge pollutant from point source into navigable waters);
CWA § 502, 33 V.S.c. § 1362(l2)(A) (2000) (defining the "discharge of a pollutant" as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source"».
192. Id. at 2228 (contrasting CWA § 404, 33 V.S.c. § 1344 (2000) (requiring permit before
anyone may place fill into wetlands) with CWA § 402, 33 V.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (requiring permit
before anyone may discharge pollutant from point source into navigable waters).
193. Id. at 2235.
194. Id. at 2227,2235.
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B. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Next, it will be helpful to consider Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion to
better understand whether Justice Kennedy's opinion concurring in the judgment
is closer to the plurality opinion or the dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens
argued that Justice Kennedy, and especially the plurality opinion, failed to give
sufficient deference to the Corps' interpretation of a complex regulatory statute
that Congress had delegated to the Corps to administer and ignored that Congress
had implicitly acquiesced in that interpretation. 195 Justice Stevens contended that
the Court should defer to the Corps' "reasonable interpretation" that protecting
wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters enhance the ecology and
hydrology of "waters of the United States.,,196
1. Justice Stevens Strongly Disagrees with the Plurality Opinion.-Justice
Stevens argued that Riverside Bayview controlled the decision in Rapanos even
though the wetlands in the former case were adjacent to actual navigable waters
and the ones in the present cases were not. 197 He stated, "Our unanimous opinion
in Riverside Bayview squarely controls these cases.,,198 Justice Stevens
explained,
[a]lthough the particular wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview abutted
a navigable creek, we framed the question presented as whether the
Clean Water Act "authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain
permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries." 199
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia explicitly disagreed and concluded that Riverside
Bayview could not control the different facts at issue in the two Sixth Circuit
cases before the Court. 2oo Justice Stevens, conversely, rejected "the plurality'S
revisionist reading" of Riverside Bayview "that 'adjacent' means having a
'continuous surface connection' between the wetland and its neighboring creek"
when that Court had actually defined adjacent as "wetlands that form the border
of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters.,,20!
Justice Stevens argued that the plurality's heavy reliance on SWANCC was
misplaced because that case was about isolated waters and "had nothing to say
about wetlands, let alone about wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable
waters or their tributaries.,,202 Instead, he argued that Riverside Bayview should
control because wetlands adjacent to tributaries play the same ecological role as

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2253.
at 2255.

(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985»
(emphasis added by Justice Stevens).
200. [d. at 2229-30 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
201. [d. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134).
202. [d. at 2256.
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the adjacent wetlands at issue in that case, and the term "waters of the United
States" is an ambiguous phrase that the Corps may reasonably construe to include
all non-isolated wetlands, including those adjacent to tributaries. 203 Furthermore,
the dissenters argued that Riverside Bayview allowed the Corps to regulate all
adjacent wetlands because most serve important ecological values and have a
significant nexus to navigable waters without imposing a requirement that the
courts and the Corps conduct a case-by-case examination of these connections
in every single case, which the plurality and Justice Kennedy would require. 204
Justice Stevens contended that the plurality had exaggerated the costs of wetlands
regulation, ignored the benefits of such regulation, and, most importantly, that
it was inappropriate for the judiciary to engage in policy balancing that is the role
of Congress and the COrpS.205
Justice Stevens sharply disagreed with the plurality's requirement that
jurisdictional waters must be "relatively permanent" because even the dictionary
definition in Webster's Second that they relied upon which defines "streams" as
"waters" does not address whether streams must be continuous or may be
intermittent, such as a 290-day stream. 206 He argued that "common sense and
common usage demonstrate that intermittent streams, like perennial streams, are
still streams.,,207 Additionally, the dissent contended that the plurality'S
attempted distinction between permanent waters and intermittent point sources
is flawed since "all hold water permanently as well as intermittently.,,208
Furthermore, Justice Stevens responded that the Act's general policy that
states retain primary responsibility for preventing water pollution does not justify
the plurality's claim that protecting states' rights requires a narrow construction
ofthe term "waters of the United States" to exclude intermittent waters. 209 Under
the Commerce Clause, he argued that Congress may regulate any intermittent
waters to prevent pollution or protect against floods in navigable waters. 210 Also,
Justice Stevens asserted that the plurality's "separate requirement that 'the
wetland has a continuous surface connection' with its abutting waterway" ignores
the impact that neighboring waters without such an explicit connection may have
Moreover, he maintained that the plurality's
on navigable waters. 2Il
distinction between limited federal regulation of allegedly immobile fill in
wetlands and greater federal regulation of mobile pollutants from point sources
was flawed because silt from wetland fill could be carried downstream and thus
bring pollution downstream.212 Furthermore, Justice Stevens also contended that
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there was justification for federal regulation of immobile fill because excessive
sediment can harm invertebrates and fish spawning.213
2. Justice Stevens Disagrees with Justice Kennedy's "Significant Nexus"
Test.-Although he "generally agree[d] with Parts I and II-A" of Justice
Kennedy's opinion, which summarized the Act's history and disagreed with the
plurality opinion in most respects, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice
Kennedy's "view that we should replace regulatory standards that have been in
place for over 30 years with a judicially crafted rule distilled from the term
'significant nexus' as used in SWANCc.,,214 Even if the "significant nexus" test
should be the standard, Justice Stevens argued that test "is categorically satisfied
as to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries."215 He contended
that the "significant nexus" test was satisfied in Rapanos and Carabell because
the tributary wetlands in those two cases were essentially similar to the adjacent
wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview. 216
Justice Stevens argued that "wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable
waters generally have a 'significant nexus' with the traditionally navigable
waters downstream.,,217 Unlike the isolated waters at issue in SWANCC, he
maintained that:
these wetlands can obviously have a cumulative effect on downstream
water flow by releasing waters at times of low flow or by keeping waters
back at times of high flow. This logical connection alone gives the
wetlands the "limited" connection to traditionally navigable waters that
is all the statute requires ....218
Additionally, Justice Stevens asserted, tributary wetlands "can preserve
downstream water quality by trapping sediment that filtering toxic pollutants,
protecting fish-spawning grounds, and so forth.,,219 Although conceding that a
few wetlands adjacent to tributaries may not have a significant nexus, he
contended that the vast majority will meet that test and as a result the "test will
probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered by the Act in
the long run.'>220 Justice Stevens complained that Justice Kennedy's "approach
will have the effect of creating additional work for all concerned parties,"
including developers and the COrpS.221 Justice Stevens argued that Riverside
Bayview's "deferential approach avoided" the largely unnecessary work imposed
by the "significant nexus" test. 222 Disagreeing with Justice Kennedy, Justice
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Stevens saw "no reason to change Riverside Bayview's approach-and every
reason to continue to defer to the Executive's sensible, bright-line rule.',m
3. Justice Stevens's Conclusion.-Justice Stevens concluded:
By curtailing the Corps' jurisdiction of more than 30 years, the plurality
needlessly jeopardizes the quality of our waters. In doing so, the
plurality disregards the deference it owes the Executive, the
congressional acquiescence in the Executive's position that we
recognized in Riverside Bayview, and its own obligation to interpret laws
rather than to make them. While Justice KENNEDY's approach has far
fewer faults, nonetheless it also fails to give proper deference to the
agencies entrusted by Congress to implement the Clean Water Act.224
The dissenters would have affirmed the judgments in both cases, thus disagreeing
with the decision of five members of the Court to vacate and remand.225 Justice
Stevens observed that the case was unusual because the plurality and Justice
Kennedy proposed different tests to be applied on remand and therefore Justice
Stevens suggested how the lower courts should reconcile those differences. 226
"Given that all four Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the
Corps' jurisdiction in both of these cases-and in all other cases in which either
the plurality's or Justice KENNEDY's test is satisfied," Justice Stevens declared
that "on remand each of the judgments should be reinstated if either of those tests
is met.',227 The DOJ has explicitly endorsed his approach in its motion for
remand in the Rapanos case now before the Sixth Circuit. 228 Justice Stevens
further explained that Justice Kennedy's test would apply in most circumstances,
but that it was possible in a few cases that the plurality opinion would be broader
and thus operative. 229 "I assume that Justice KENNEDY's approach will be
controlling in most cases because it treats more of the Nation's waters as within
the Corps' jurisdiction, but in the unlikely event that the plurality's test is met but
Justice KENNEDY's is not, courts should also uphold the Corps' jurisdiction. ,,230
As is discussed below, Justice Stevens's assertion about there being a working
majority whenever either the plurality or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied is
also arguably supported by the Court's subsequent League of United Latin
American Citizens decision, which was decided the week after Rapanos and
involved different working majorities on different issues. 231
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C. Justice Kennedy's Crucial Opinion

1. The Significant Nexus Test is the Key to the Act's Jurisdiction.-At the
beginning of his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that SWANCC had held that the
tenn "navigable waters" under the Act is defined by whether a water or wetland
"possess[es] a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were navigable in fact or
that could reasonably be so made.,,232 Explaining his decision to write a solo
opinion, he observed that neither the plurality opinion nor the dissenting opinion
"chooses to apply this test[. ]"233 Justice Kennedy explained that the Sixth Circuit
in the two cases below had applied the "significant nexus" test, but "it did not
consider all the factors necessary to determine whether the lands in question had,
or did not have, the requisite nexus. In my view the cases ought to be remanded
to the Court of Appeals for proper consideration of the nexus requirement. ,,234
His introductory paragraph announces that the "significant nexus" test is the
crucial standard for lower courts to consider in determining whether wetlands
that are not adjacent to navigable waters have the "requisite nexus" to navigable
or potentially navigable waters. 235
Justice Kennedy took a much more positive view of the Corps regulations
defining the Act's jurisdiction than the plurality. He wrote, "Contrary to the
plurality's description wetlands are not simply moist patches of earth. ,,236 Justice
Kennedy explained that the Corps regulations and its lengthy Wetlands
Delineation Manual carefully define wetlands by requiring the presence of the
following factors:
(1) prevalence of plant species typically adapted to saturated soil
conditions; ... (2) hydric soil, meaning soil that is saturated, flooded, or
ponded for sufficient time during the growing season to become
anaerobic, or lacking in oxygen, in the upper part; and (3) wetland
hydrology, a tenn generally requiring continuous inundation or
saturation to the surface during at least five percent of the growing
season in most years. 237
Under the Corps regulations, wetlands that meet these criteria and are adjacent
to tributaries of navigable waters are within the Act's jurisdiction, "even if they
are 'separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like.',,238
In reviewing the facts of the two cases, especially Rapanos, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the facts favorable to the government. The District Court in Rapanos

232. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,167, 172 (2001».
233. [d. at 2236; see also id. at 2241.
234. [d. at 2236.
235. [d.
236. [d. at 2237 (citation omitted).
237. [d. at 2237-38.
238. [d. at 2238 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2005».

2007]

IMPLEMENTING RAPANOS

317

had found surface water connections between wetlands on all three parcels of
Rapanos' land and navigable waters or tributaries that flow into such waters. 239
In Carabell, a berm currently prevented surface-water flow from the wetlands at
issue into a ditch that eventually flowed in navigable waters, but there was some
evidence that water might flow in the future if the Carabells were allowed to fill
the disputed wetlands. 240
In discussing the seminal Riverside Bayview and SWANCC decisions, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that the key issue underlying both decisions was whether a
significant nexus existed between the wetlands at issue and navigable or
potentially navigable waters.241 He observed that the Riverside Bayview Court
had held that "'the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between
waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act,'"
although the Court only addressed wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 242 In
SWANCC, the Court interpreted Riverside Bayview as resting on an implied
significant nexus test and held that isolated waters lacked such a nexus. 243 For
Justice Kennedy, "[a]bsent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is
lacking.,,244 Accordingly, "[b]ecause neither the plurality nor the dissent
addresses the nexus requirement, this separate opinion, in my respectful view, is
necessary. ,,245
2. Rejecting the Plurality Opinion.-Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
plurality opinion's two-part test and most of its reasoning. 246 He rejected the
plurality's first requirement of either "permanently standing water or continuous
flow" because intermittent waters, especially in the western United States,
frequently have far more significant impacts than most continuously flowing
small streams. 247 Although Congress in theory could have excluded intermittent
waters despite their importance, Justice Kennedy observed that the definition of
waters in Webster's Second includes "flood or inundation," which he reasoned
would indicate that Congress meant to include intermittent waters as waters of
the United States. 248 Additionally, the plurality's contention that Riverside
Bayview's use of the term "hydrographic feature[]" limits the definition of waters
to permanent waters is flawed because the phrase could easily apply to

239. [d.
240. [d. at 2239-40.
241. [d. at 2240-41.
242. [d. at 2240 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134
(1985».
243. [d. at 2241 (citing Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 172 (2001».
244. [d. at 2241.
245. [d.
246. [d. at 2241-47.
247. [d. at 2242.
248. [d. at 2242-43 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY, supra note 165,
at 2882).
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"intennittent streams carrying substantial flow to navigable waters.,,249
Furthermore, the plurality's argument that the Act makes a clear distinction
between permanent waters of the United States and intennittent point sources is
wrong Justice Kennedy asserted because either waters or point sources can be
permanent or intennittent. 25o
Moreover, Justice Kennedy responded that the "plurality's second
limitation~xclusion of wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to
other jurisdictional waters-is also unpersuasive.,,251 He rejected the plurality's
interpretation of Riverside Bayview as including only wetlands that "are
'indistinguishable' from waters to which they bear a surface connection."252
Although the plurality may be correct that Riverside Bayview included adjacent
wetlands as waters of the U.S. in part because of the difficulty in drawing the line
between open waters and wetlands, Justice Kennedy responded that the Riverside
Bayview decision had rejected the requirement that water must flow between
wetlands and navigable waters. 253 Instead it had allowed their regulation because
it was reasonable "'for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases,
adjacent wetlands have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic
ecosystem. ",254 Furthermore, Riverside Bayview presumed that wetlands created
by flooding as opposed to continuous surface flow may be regulated as adjacent
wetlands. 255 Also, adjacent wetlands may protect water quality by filtering
substances that would otherwise harm navigable waters even if there is not a
direct surface connection. 256
Justice Kennedy concluded, "[i]n sum the plurality's opinion is inconsistent
with the Act's text, structure, and purpose.,,257 He criticized "the plurality's
overall tone and approach" for being "unduly dismissive" of the public interest
in protecting wetlands and aquatic quality.258 Justice Kennedy argued that "[t]he
limits the plurality would impose, moreover, give insufficient deference to
Congress' purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act and to the authority of the
Executive to implement that statutory mandate.,,259
Finally, Justice Kennedy disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts's concurring
opinion, which argued that the Corps should have issued revised regulations in
the wake of SWANCc. 260 Justice Kennedy observed that "because the plurality
presents its interpretation of the Act as the only pennissible reading of the plain

249. [d. at 2243.
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at 2244.
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text ... the Corps would lack discretion, under the plurality's theory, to adopt
contrary regulations."261 He responded, "[n]ew rulemaking could have averted
the disagreement here only if the Corps had anticipated the unprecedented
reading of the Act that the plurality advances."262
3. Disagreeing with the Dissenting Opinion.-Justice Kennedy had some
significant disagreements with the dissenting opinion, but he agreed with it more
than he did with the plurality opinion. He stated, "[w]hile the plurality reads
nonexistent requirements into the Act, the dissent reads a central requirement
out-namely, the requirement that the word 'navigable' in 'navigable waters' be
given some importance.,,263 Justice Kennedy rejected the dissenting opinion's
interpretation that the term "navigable waters" was so ambiguous that the Corps
was entitled to regulate any non-isolated waters. 264 He claimed, "the dissent
would permit federal regulation whenever wetlands lie alongside a ditch or drain,
however remote and insubstantial, that eventually may flow into traditional
navigable waters. The deference owed to the Corps' interpretation of the statute
does not extend so far."265 Although the Act is not limited to only navigable in
fact waters, Justice Kennedy observed that SWANCC had stated that "the word
'navigable' in the Act must be given some effect.,,266
Rejecting the dissenting opinion's complete deference to the Corps
regulations, Justice Kennedy stated, "the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands
depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in
question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.,,267 He accepted the
Corps' general rationale in its 1977 regulations for regulating wetlands "that
wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other
waters-functions such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff
storage.,,268 Justice Kennedy demanded, however, that the Corps demonstrate a
specific ecological nexus between the wetlands it seeks to regulate and navigable
waters. He explained,
wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory
phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as "navigable." When, in contrast,
wetlands' effects on water quality are speCUlative or insubstantial, they
fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term navigable

261. ld. at 2247; see also id. at 2225-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
262. [d. at 2247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263. /d.
264. [d. at 2248.
265. [d. at 2247.
266. [d. (citing Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001».
267. ld. at 2248.
268. [d. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (2005».
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waters. 269

4. Calling on the Corps to Issue Regulations Defining What is a Significant
Nexus.-Justice Kennedy strongly encouraged the Corps to issue new regulations
defining when tributary wetlands have a significant nexus with navigable
waters. 270 He first observed that the Corps' current test for wetlands adjacent to
traditional navigable waters is reasonable because for such wetlands a
"reasonable inference of ecological interconnection" can be drawn as recognized
in Riverside Bayview.271 Por the tributary wetlands at issue in the current two
cases, however, Justice Kennedy contended that one could not presume such a
close connection to navigable waters. 272 Pirst, the Corps' definition of tributary
includes any water that "feeds into a traditional navigable water (or a tributary
thereof) and possesses an ordinary high-water mark, defined as a 'line on the
shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by [certain] physical
characteristics,' [33 C.P.R.] § 328.3(e)."273 Although this definition had some
merit if the Corps applied it consistently, he contended that the Corps' broad
definition of tributary "seems to leave wide room for regulation of drains,
ditches, and streams remote from any navigable-in-fact water and carrying only
minor water-volumes towards it" and that this definition "precludes its adoption
as the determinative measure of whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play an
important role in the integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters
as traditionally understood.,,274 Because wetlands adjacent to tributaries do not
always have a significant nexus with navigable waters, Justice Kennedy argued
that the Corps needed to define which categories of tributary wetlands have
significant ecological nexus with navigable waters by either issuing new
regulations or deciding the issue through case-by-case adjudications. 275
To encourage the Corps to issue new regulations addressing his significant
nexus test, Justice Kennedy suggested relevant factors the Corps could evaluate
to
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either
annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other
relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to
them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions
for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters. 276

269. Id.
270. Id. at 2248-49.
271. Id. at 2248.
272. /d. at 2249.
273. Id. at 2237, 2248-49; see generally Virginia Albrecht & Deidre Duncan, Justice
Kennedy's Concurring Opinion in Rapanos Suggests Needfor Rulemaking, 37 ENV'TREp. (BNA)
1647 (2006).
274. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2248.
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Until the Corps issued such regulations, he observed that the Corps, developers,
and lower courts would have to address whether there is a significant nexus
between tributary wetlands and navigable waters on a case-by-case basis.277
Justice Kennedy also suggested, "[w]here an adequate nexus is established for
a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a matter of administrative
convenience or necessity, to presume covered status for other comparable
wetlands in the region," but he acknowledged that this idea was dicta because
"[t]hat issue, however, is neither raised by these facts nor addressed by any
agency regulation that accommodates the nexus requirement outlined here. ,,278
Justice Kennedy obliquely rejected a quasi-constitutional argument raised by
the plurality against a broad interpretation of the Corps' authority. The plurality
opinion, without directly endorsing the constitutional challenge by the
petitioners, stated that the Corps' interpretation of its authority over wetlands
"stretches the outer limits of Congress's commerce power.,,279 Justice Kennedy,
however, stated that wetlands as defined by his significant nexus test "raise no
serious constitutional or federalism difficulty.,,280 He explained that application
of the significant nexus test would "prevent[] problematic applications of the
statute.,,281 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy argued that if his test allowed a few
examples of federal regulation that arguably intruded on legitimate state
sovereignty, these isolated instances were of no importance as part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme that legitimately regulates commerce. 282 He
cited the Court's 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich283 in which the Court held
that Congress may prohibit states from legalizing medical marijuana even if most
of the medical marijuana does not enter interstate commerce because the
challenged statute serves the comprehensive purpose of regulating interstate
commerce in marijuana and the fact that the statute may intrude on some purely
intrastate commerce does not undermine its overall validity. Thus, Justice
Kennedy argued that his test was constitutional pursuant to the Court's
comprehensive doctrine even if his test might intrude on state sovereignty.
5. Suggesting the Government Would Likely Win on Remand.-Justice
Kennedy stated that it was necessary to remand the two cases because the lower
courts had not fully applied the significant nexus test he had discussed in his
opinion in determining whether the government had proven a sufficient
connection between the wetlands on Rapanos' s and Carabell' s properties and
navigable waters. 284 He suggested that there may be sufficient evidence of such
a nexus for the government to win both cases and that the end result on remand
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would likely be closer to the dissenting opinion. 285 Justice Kennedy stated that
the "record contains evidence suggesting the possible existence of a significant
nexus according to the principles outlined above. Thus the end result in these
cases and many others to be considered by the Corps may be the same as that
suggested by the dissent, namely, that the Corps's assertion of jurisdiction is
valid. ,,286
Justice Kennedy examined the specific factual conclusions and legal
standards used in the two cases below. In Rapanos, he observed that the "District
Court found that each of the wetlands bore surface water connections to
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters," but he faulted the Sixth Circuit for
applying a "mere hydrological connection" test that did not assess how
significant the nexus was between the wetlands and navigable waters. 287 In
Carabell, Justice Kennedy suggested that the record contained evidence by the
Corps that filling the wetlands could cause ecological harm, but he claimed that
this evidence was too speculative to meet the substantial evidence required to
justify the Corps claims. 288 Justice Kennedy further commented, "[a]s in
Rapanos, though, the [Carabell] record gives little indication of the quantity and
regularity of flow in the adjacent tributaries-a consideration that may be
important in assessing the nexus. Also, as in Rapanos, the legal standard applied
[in Carabell] to the facts was imprecise.,,289 He also observed that the Sixth
Circuit in Carabell had stated that a hydrological connection between the
wetlands at issue and navigable waters was not necessary and expressed his view
that "that much of its holding is correct. Given the role wetlands play in
pollutant filtering, flood control, and runoff storage, it may well be the absence
of hydrologic connection (in the sense of interchange of waters) that shows the
wetlands' significance for the aquatic system.,,290 Justice Kennedy reasoned,
however, that the Court must remand the Carabell decision because the Corps
had relied too much on the mere adjacency of the wetlands to a tributary without
the necessary analysis of how significantly connected the wetlands are to
navigable waters. 291 He concluded, "[i]n these consolidated cases I would vacate
the judgments of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration whether the
specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with navigable waters.,,292

D. Chief Justice Roberts's Concurring Opinion
While joining the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts also wrote a
separate, solo concurring opinion. He first criticized the Corps and EPA for

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

[d.
/d.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 2250-51.
at 2251.

at 2251-52.
at 2252.
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failing to issue new wetlands regulations in the wake of SWANCC, contrary to
their promise to do so in the 2003 ANPRM. 293 Citing the Chevron doctrine of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, Roberts
suggested that the Court would have given the Agencies "generous leeway" if
they had narrowed their regulations in light of SWANCc. 294 He complained,
"[r]ather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our generous
standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the
scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency.,,295 As
Justice Kennedy observed, it is questionable whether the three other members of
the plurality would have been as generous as Chief Justice Roberts suggests if the
Corps had adopted new regulations that included intermittent waters or waters
without a surface connection. 296
If the Corps had adopted regulations that were narrower than its 1977
regulations but broader than the plurality's approach, it is an interesting, but
unknowable question whether any members of the plurality opinion would have
deferred to these hypothetical regulations. "Malcolm Stewart, the assistant U.S.
solicitor general who wrote the government briefs for the two wetland cases
defended the Corps" by arguing, "[i]t is more advantageous to do rulemaking
now after the Supreme Court has issued more nuanced guidance on the
subject.,,297 Until Justice Kennedy's Rapanos opinion, the Agencies may have
been unsure of the Court's approach to the Act's jurisdiction, so Chief Justice
Roberts's criticism of their inaction is somewhat unfair.
Chief Justice Roberts was clearly unhappy that the Court failed to provide
clear guidance to the lower courts on the scope of the Act, but he also implied
that lower courts could find sufficient guidance in many cases by examining both
the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's opinion. Roberts stated,
It is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority of the Court on

precisely how to read Congress' limits on the reach of the Clean Water
Act. Lower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way
on a case-by-case basis. This situation is certainly not unprecedented.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 ... (2003) (discussing
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 ... (1977)). What is unusual in this
instance, perhaps, is how readily the situation could have been

293. [d. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
294. [d. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-45
(1984». Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion also argued that courts should give Chevron deference
to any regulations that the Corps wrote to implement the "significant nexus" test. [d. at 2266
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
295. [d. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
296. [d. at 2247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Amena H. Saiyid, Corps of Engineers Urged to Write Rules to Clarify U.S. Jurisdiction
Over Wetlands, 37 ENV'TREp. (BNA) 1328 (2006).
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avoided.298
Part IV.C will discuss the Department of Justice's dual approach to whether
lower courts should follow the plurality or Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
as well as scholarly disagreement about how lower courts should apply the Marks
decision to the Rapanos opinions. 299

E. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Although he joined Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer also
wrote a separate and solo dissent in which he urged the Corps to "speedily" write
new regulations. 3°O He argued that Congress wanted the Corps "to make the
complex technical judgments that lie at the heart of the present cases (subject to
deferential judicial review)" rather than have courts "make ad hoc determinations
that run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of law.,,30I
Breyer also argued that courts should give Chevron deference to any regulations
that the Corps wrote to implement the "significant nexus" test. 302

F. Analysis oJRapanos
1. Not a Revolutionary Decision.-The Rapanos Court was one vote short
of a major change in the Act's jurisdiction. 303 The plurality opinion would have
drastically restricted the scope of the Act by limiting "waters of the United
States" to permanent, standing or continuously flowing waters. By excluding
most intermittent or ephemeral waters, the plurality would eliminate federal
regulation of many rivers and streams, especially in the often dry western
states. 304 Furthermore, this approach would have threatened federal regulation
of many headwaters and canals even in generally wet Eastern and Midwestern
states. 305 The plurality approach would have rejected the Corps' interpretation
of the statute since 1975, which both Republican and Democratic administrations
have accepted. 306 The plurality interpretation shows the dangers of a textualist
approach that relies on ajudge deciding which is the "best" dictionary definition
from among many possibilities and arrogantly ignores the environmental
expertise of the Corps and EPA over the last thirty years?07 In light of the

298. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
299. See infra Part IV.C.
300. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
303. Howe Posting, supra note 24.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id
307. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1278-90 (1996) (arguing textualist statutory interpretation undervalues
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multiple definitions of "waters," Justice Scalia should have been more willing to
consider the possibility that the statute was ambiguous and that deference to the
agencies that Congress delegated responsibility for enforcing the Act was
appropriate.
The plurality also questioned the scope of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause, although it did not ultimately address that issue because it
was not before the Court. 308 Justice Scalia did appropriately observe that a major
purpose of the Act is to preserve a primary role for states in implementing its
policies,309 but he ignored the opposition of the 43 states to any significant
narrowing of the current regulatory scheme. 310 He appears to take a formalist
approach to what he thinks is the appropriate federalist division of
responsibilities without looking at the empirical evidence of what most state
governments actually want.
Justice Kennedy rejected the two central tests ofthe plurality opinion, first,
the permanent, standing, or continuously flowing waters requirement; and,
second, the surface water connection requirement. 311 Although he disagreed with
all the other members of the Court for failing to adopt his significant nexus test,
Justice Kennedy agreed far more with the dissenting opinion than with the
plurality opinion.312 For example, he explicitly agreed with the dissenting
opinion that "waters" as defined in the Act includes intermittently flowing waters
and explicitly disagreed with the plurality opinion's exclusion of impermanent
Justice Kennedy also rejected the "plurality's second
waters. 313
lirnitation-exclusion of wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to
other jurisdictional waters.,,314 He concludes, "In sum the plurality's opinion is
inconsistent with the Act's text, structure, and purpose."315 Justice Kennedy's
rejection of the plurality opinion is far more complete than his criticism of the
dissenting opinion. He explicitly acknowledges that in most cases, including the
two cases below, his significant nexus test is likely to lead to the same result as
would occur under the dissenting opinion's complete deference to the Corps'

agency expertise in addressing complex environmental issues) [hereinafter Mank, Textualist
Approach].
308. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
309. United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223-24 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000».
310. [d. at 2256 nA (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311. See supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
312. Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.comlmovabletype/
archiveS/2006/06/more_on_rapanos.html (June 19,2006, 13:54 EST) (quoting William Buzbee);
Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com (June 19,200613:30 EST)
(quoting Richard Lazarus); infra notes 462-64 and accompanying text.
313. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2243 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he dissent is correct to
observe that an intermittent flow can constitute a stream" and "the plurality concludes ... that
navigable waters may not be intermittent. The conclusion is unsound.").
314. [d. at 2244-46.
315. [d. at 2246.
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existing regulations. 316
2. Is the Significant Nexus Test Appropriate ?-Justice Kennedy was the
only member of the Court to adopt the "significant nexus" test. It is important
to understand why neither the plurality nor the dissenting opinion accepted that
test. Both the plurality and dissenting opinions argued that SWANCC' s use of the
term "significant nexus" was less significant than Justice Kennedy in
understanding the scope of the Act, although for different reasons. Although his
test is relatively vague, Justice Kennedy's significant nexus standard seeks to
give meaning to an interpretation of the Act that is broader than traditional
navigable waters, but still limits the Act's jurisdiction by requiring a significant
connection between jurisdictional wetlands and navigable waters.
a. The plurality criticizes the "significant nexus" test.-The plurality
sharply criticized the "significant nexus" test. The plurality argued that Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" test was flawed because he expanded its meaning
far beyond its use in SWANCC or what it could have meant in Riverside
Bayview. 3J7 Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test requires the Corps to
"establish ... on a case-by-case basis" whether wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries "significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable. ",318 By
contrast, the plurality argued, Riverside Bayview had "explicitly rejected such
case-by-case determinations of ecological significance for the jurisdictional
question whether a wetland is covered, holding instead that all physically
connected wetlands are covered.,,319 Furthermore, SWANCC's only example of
a significant nexus was the abutting wetlands in Riverside Bayview. 320 Thus, the
plurality reasoned that Justice Kennedy's approach,
misreads SWANCC' s "significant nexus" statement as mischaracterizing
Riverside Bayview to adopt a case-by-case test of ecological
significance; and then transfers that standard to a context that Riverside
Bayview expressly declined to address (namely, wetlands nearby nonnavigable tributaries); while all the time conceding that this standard
does not apply in the context that Riverside Bayview did address
(wetla!lds abutting navigable waterways).321
A weakness of the plurality's argument is that, while the SWANCC decision used
Riverside Bayview as the only example of a "significant nexus,,,322 the Court's
use of the term also suggested that a "significant nexus" between wetlands and

316. Id. at 2250.
317. Id. at 2233 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
318. Id.; see also id. at 2248-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 2233 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 167-68 (2001) ("It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters'
that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.").
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navigable waters is a fundamental test for whether wetlands are within the Act's
jurisdiction, which is Justice Kennedy's interpretation of SWANCC. 323
More importantly, the plurality argued that Justice Kennedy's opinion was
fundamentally flawed because his test failed to address the meaning of the Act's
text and structure. 324 The plurality argued that Justice Kennedy's "significant
nexus" test placed far too much weight on a phrase that appears in only one
sentence of one prior Court opinion and is found nowhere in the Act's text. 325
The plurality's argument that Justice Kennedy's opinion places far too much
weight on the phrase "significant nexus" is shared by the dissenting opinion. 326
More controversial, is the plurality's argument that a "significant nexus" between
waters and wetlands only exists if there is a "physical connection" between them
so that they are "as a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United
States.,,327 The plurality dismissed Justice Kennedy's test that the Act includes
wetlands that significantly affect navigable waters as the linguistic absurdity
"that whatever (alone or in combination) affects waters of the United States is
waters of the United States?,,328
The plurality charged that Justice Kennedy had re-written the statute by
ignoring the statute's text and then tried to justify the "significant nexus"
standard as serving the Act's ecological purposes, although at the same time
ignoring the federalist policies in the statute. 329 The plurality argued that Justice
Kennedy had essentially but wrongly set forth an interpretation which means that
anything that "affects waters is waters.'>330 Although Justice Kennedy claimed
that his approach limited the authority of the Corps compared to the dissenting
opinion's approach, the plurality feared that the "opaque" significant nexus test
would in practice allow the Corps to regulate virtually everything it had under its
current regulations. 33 )
b. The dissenting opinion disagrees with the "significant nexus" test.-The
dissenting opinion disagreed with making the "significant nexus" test the crucial
jurisdictional test for the Act but for different reasons than the plurality. Justice
Stevens argued,
I do not share [Justice Kennedy's] view that we should replace
regulatory standards that have been in place for over 30 years with a
judicially crafted rule distilled from the term "significant nexus" as used
in SWANCC. To the extent that our passing use of this term has become
a statutory requirement, it is categorically satisfied as to wetlands

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
[d. at 2234-35 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
[d. at 2234.
See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2234 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis in original).
[d. (emphasis in original).
[d. at 2234-35.
[d. at 2235.
[d. at2234n.15.
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adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries. 332
The dissenting opinion argued that the Riverside Bayview had addressed
wetlands both adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries and, thus, that
only isolated waters like those in SWANCC were excluded. 333 Additionally,
Justice Stevens maintained "it [is] clear that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of
navigable waters generally have a 'significant nexus' with the traditionally
navigable waters downstream[,]"334 because of their ecological impacts. 335
Although the dissenting opinion disagreed with requiring the Corps to meet the
"significant nexus" test, Justice Stevens optimistically predicted that the test
would have little actual impact on restricting the Corps' .authority, but would
simply create a great deal of unnecessary work for the Corps without changing
the ultimate result in most cases. 336
c. Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test is consistent with precedent,
but poses practical problems.-The extra work from the Corps that Justice
Kennedy's approach would require makes sense only if one interprets the Act as
broader than the plurality's physical connection approach, but narrower than the
Corps' regulations or the dissenting opinion. Under an "intermediate"
interpretation of the statute, the Corps cannot simply regulate any wet area in the
United States, but only those that have a significant nexus with navigable waters,
as SWANCChad suggested in a single sentence. 337 Because so many intermittent
streams have important hydrological and ecological impacts, one must be
skeptical that Justice Scalia's permanent flowing waters interpretation is the only
reasonable interpretation of the Act, especially when inundation or flood is an
alternative meaning of the word "waters.'>338 Additionally, his second
requirement that wetlands have a physical surface connection with navigable
waters so that they are "indistinguishable" from those waters again contradicts
the scientific reality that many long recognized wetlands are mostly land-like, are
frequently filters for navigable waters, and are easily distinguishable from
flowing waters. 339
Justice Kennedy is correct that the dissent ignores "the requirement that the
word 'navigable' in 'navigable waters' be given some importance."340 Although
the Riverside Bayview decision had stated that navigability was of limited import
in determining the Act's scope, the SWANCC Court stated that
it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it
no effect whatever. The term "navigable" has at least the import of

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

[d. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 2264-65.

See supra notes 232-35, 241-45, 267,269-77 and accompanying text.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
[d. at 2244-47.
[d. at 2247.
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showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the
[Act]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been
navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made. 341
The dissent tried to limit SWANCC to its facts of excluding isolated waters from
the Act's jurisdiction,342 but Justice Kennedy rightly reads the case as also
requiring that waters within the Act's jurisdiction have some relationship to
navigable waters. 343 Thus, the dissenters' deferential approach to the Corps'
regulations in Rapanos is inconsistent with SWANCC's emphasis that
navigability still matters. It is not surprising that the four Rapanos dissenters had
all also dissented in SWANCc. 344
In a prior article, the author predicted that the Court would use the
"significant nexus" phrase in SWANCC as its key jurisdictional test for the Act
because it was the only possible standard in that case to give some meaning to the
case's statement that navigability still had some "import" in defining the scope
of the Act. 345 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have all used the
"significant nexus" test as a key test for detennining the Act's jurisdiction,
although the Fifth Circuit defined the test much more narrowly than the other
circuits to so far include only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 346 For
example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Deaton found that there was a
sufficient nexus between tributary wetlands and navigable to allow the
government to exercise "jurisdiction over the whole tributary system of any
navigable waterway," including roadside ditches. 347 The Sixth and Tenth
Circuits have explicitly endorsed Deaton's approach to the significant nexus test
as applied to tributaries and decisions in the First and Seventh Circuits have
praised Deaton. 348 The Ninth Circuit in Baccarat Fremont Developers, UC v.

341. Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 172 (2003).
342. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2256-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 2242-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
344. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
345. Mank, supra note 4.
346. United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 170, 175, 180-81 (1st Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded, No. 05-1444,
2006 WL 3072145 (1st Cir. Oct. 31,2006); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 639-41 (6th
Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded; 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 347 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698,712 (4th Cir. 2003); infra notes 347-50, 417 and
accompanying text.
347. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 712.
348. Hubenka, 438 F.3d at 1034; United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2003);
see also Johnson, 437 F.3d at 169-81 (stating that Deaton "provides helpful methodological and
substantive guidance"); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 807 (7th Cir. 2005)
("Whether the wetlands are 100 miles from a navigable waterway or 6 feet, if water from the
wetlands enters a stream that flows into the navigable waterway, the wetlands are 'waters of the
United States' within the meaning of the Act."), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006),
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United States Anny Corps of Engineers,349 however, stated that "case-by-case"
application of the "significant nexus" test was not required to find jurisdiction
under the CWA, although the Court went on to apply the test anyway and found
that it had been met. 350 The fact that several different courts of appeals had
emphasized the importance of the "significant nexus" test before Justice
Kennedy's Rapanos opinion is strong evidence that it is a useful approach to
understanding the Court's precedent in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC.
Adopting the "significant nexus" test has the advantage of making Rapanos
consistent with SWANCC. Conversely, there is a strong argument that Justice
Kennedy's approach to the "significant nexus" test will mean a great deal of
work for the Corps, but in the end, the use of the test will result in little actual
change in how they define wetlands because of Justice Kennedy's expansive
interpretation of the test. Justice Kennedy broadly defined the "significant
nexus" test in light of the ecological goals of the Act, to '''restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' ,,351 Thus,
he stated that wetlands are within the Act's jurisdiction if they "either alone or
in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as 'navigable. ",352 The dissenting opinion emphasized similar
ecological factors. 353
In a prior article, this author argued that the Court should define significant
nexus in terms of whether there is a significant hydrological connection between
wetlands and navigable waters. 354 A minor hydrological connection would be
insufficient. Justice Kennedy agreed that drains, ditches, and streams carrying
only a minor volume of water to navigable waters should be excluded from the
Act. 355 My approach would have allowed the consideration of ecological factors
only as a tie breaker in close cases where the hydrological flow was moderate in
volume. 356 Unlike the plurality opinion, my approach would have allowed courts
to consider groundwater hydrological connections between wetlands and
navigable waters, although I acknowledged that whether groundwater is included
within the Act is a close and difficult issue. 357
The approach in my prior article had both advantages and disadvantages

modified 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 898, 704-12
(4th Cir. 2003).
349. 425 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005).
350. [d. at ll57 -58 ("We note that even if the CWA did require demonstration of a significant
nexus on a case-by-case basis (which it does not), there is no question that one exists here.").
351. United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a) (2000».
352. [d.
353. [d. at 2257 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. Mank, supra note 4, at 821-22,883-91.
355. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
356. Mank, supra note 4, at 821-22,883-91.
357. [d. at 888-89.
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compared to Justice Kennedy's broad ecological interpretation of SWANCC's
significant nexus test. There is an advantage in focusing on only whether there
is a significant hydrological connection because a single factor is easier for the
Corps and courts to measure than the myriad of issues that are involved in
ecological connections. The disadvantage is that ecological factors are a major
goal in the Act's general purposes, although not necessarily within its definition
of "navigable waters" or "waters of the United States.,,358 My approach included
the consideration of ecological factors in "close cases." The difference between
my test and Justice Kennedy's would be primarily in cases where there is no, or
only a minor hydrological connection between a particular wetlands and
navigable waters, but where there are still significant ecological impacts between
them.359 An unspoken factor in formulating my approach was my belief that the
SWANCC decision suggested that a majority of the Court wanted a significantly
narrower jurisdiction for the Act than the approach in the Corps 1977
regulations. It was not until Rapanos that it became clear that there were
significant differences between Justice Kennedy and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
who had all joined the SWANCC majority.
As the dissent argued, Justice Kennedy's inclusion of ecological factors in
his "significant nexus" test will likely mean that the Corps will regulate almost
as many wetlands as it does under its current regulations, but that his new test
will likely require the Agencies to spend significant time and resources to issue
new guidance or regulations justifying the regulation of these same wetlands. 360
In fact, his approach could allow the government to regulate for the first time
wetlands that are not adjacent to tributaries that have a significant ecological
impact on navigable waters. 361 Additionally, before it issues new regulations or
guidance, the Corps and the lower courts will spend significant effort applying
the new test on a case-by-case basis in reviewing remanded, appealed and new
cases. As Chief Justice Roberts suggests, there may be considerable uncertainty
in the lower courts until the Agencies issue new regulations or guidance. 362
In light of all this extra work and uncertainty, it would have been easier if
Justice Kennedy had simply joined the dissenting opinion, but in light of his vote
with the SWANCC majority opinion, he likely found himself unable to join with
the four justices who had dissented in SWANCC. In the areas of national power
and federalism, Justice Kennedy has taken a centrist position that seeks a middle
ground between Justice Scalia's states' rights philosophy and Justice Stevens's
support for broad national power. 363 Thus, Justice Kennedy took a middle
position using the "significant nexus" test as the foundation of his position.

358. 33 V.S.c. § 1362(7) (2000).
359. [d. at 821-22,883-91.

360. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361. Hoped-For Guidance About Wetlands Fails to Materialize in Closely Watched Case,
SUPREME COURT TODAY, 75 V.S.L. w. 3053 (2006) (reporting Virginia Albrecht stated Kennedy's
nexus test allows non-adjacent wetlands to be jurisdictional under Act).
362. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
363. Bilionis, supra note 26, at 1354, 1376-82.
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3.
The Contrast Between Textualist and Purposivist Statutory
Interpretation.-The most important underlying difference among the three main
opinions in Rapanos was between the textualist method of statutory
interpretation used by Justice Scalia and the purposivist approaches of Justices
Kennedy and Stevens. 364 There are three main approaches to statutory
interpretation, although individual judges vary to lesser degrees in how they
interpret a statute: (1) intentionalism, (2) purposivism, and (3) textualism. 365
First, judges who primarily follow an "intentionalist" approach to interpretation
usually examine both a statute's text and its legislative history, along with other
contextual evidence in some cases, to determine the original intent of the
enacting legislature. 366 Second, judges who adopt a purposivist approach to
interpretation are more willing to look beyond the legislature's original intent to
assess the statute's goals or purposes because it may be impossible to determine
the original legislature's intent or a court must apply a statute to circumstances
that the enacting legislature did not anticipate. 367 As discussed below, advocates
of textualism have criticized both intentionalism and purposivism as flawed in
several respects, especially by giving judges too much discretion to use inferred
statutory intent or purposes as license to adopt an interpretation suiting the
judge's policy preferences. 368
Third, judges have always given significant emphasis to a statute's text in
discerning its meaning, but since the 1980s, Justice Scalia, along with Justice
Thomas and a number of judges on the lower federal courts, have promoted a
comprehensive modern textualist approach to interpretation, sometimes referred
to as "new textualism,,,369 which argues that courts should interpret a statute by
determining how a hypothetical "ordinary reader" of a statute would have
understood its words at the time of its enactment to find the statute's meaning. 370
Modern textualists contend that courts should be faithful agents of what the
legislature commands in a statute and not examine the often conflicting reasons
or intents that led individual legislators to vote for the statute. 371 They usually

364. Dorf, supra note 20.
365. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 354 (1990); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons

ofStatutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority and Deference
to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 528-42 (1998) [hereinafter Mank, Textualism].
366. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 365, at 326-27; Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at
529.
367. WIl1.lAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 25-34 (1994); Mank,
Textualism, supra note 365, at 529.
368. Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal
Precedent, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 815, 819 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, Context]; Mank, Textualism, supra
note 365, at 535-38.
369. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLAL. REv. 621 (1990)
370. ANToNIN SCAUA, A MATTTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 1623 (1997); Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 533-34.
371. Mank, Context, supra note 368, at 819; Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 533-37.
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oppose the use oflegislative history to determine statutory meaning because such
material is not presented for the approval of the President as is required by the
Constitution and since it is frequently written by a small number of legislators or
their staff and may not be reflective of the entire legislature. 372 Additionally,
modern textualist judges often argue that judges have sometimes misused
legislative history by selectively using snippets to justify personal policy
preferences. 373 Textualistjudges will consider explicit legislative purposes in a
statute, as Justice Scalia did in discussing the Act's policy of placing primary
responsibility for planning the development and use of land and water resources
in the hands of the states,374 but they are usually suspicious of judges who
emphasize legislative purpose because purposivismgives judges broad discretion
to consider legislative history, broader contextual material, or inferred legislative
intent to find a statute's purpose. 375 Although there are differences among them
in the extent to which they consider non-textual material, textualist judges
normally place greater weight on the meaning of a statute's text than any other
factor.
Before considering criticisms of textualism, it is important to recognize that
all judges are "presumptive textualists" who "follow relatively clear statutory
language absent some strong reason to deviate from it.,,376 Critics of textualism
often argue that statutory language is ambiguous or confused more often than
Justice Scalia or other textualists are willing to concede and therefore that it is
helpful to consider additional information such as legislative history to
understand its meaning, intent, or purpose. 377 Textualists often ignore or
undervalue the statutory interpretations of administrative agencies in
understanding the meaning of a statute that Congress delegated for an agency to
enforce. 378 Professor Eskridge has accused Justice Scalia of practicing a
"dogmatic textualism" that stubbornly rejects non-textualist evidence about a
statute's meaning. 379

372. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
SCAliA, supra note 370, at 29-37; Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 535-37.
373. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, 1., concurring) (arguing that if
statutory text has "plain meaning" it is unnecessary to examine statute's legislative history); SCAliA,
supra note 370, at 29-37 (criticizing legislative history as unreliable and arguing that it is
inappropriate to use such history to seek for statute's intent; instead, judges should focus on
statute's meaning); Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 535-37.
374. United States v. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223-25 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)).
375. Mank, Context, supra note 368, at 819; Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 537-38.
376. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381,408 n.119 (1993).
377. See Mank, Textualism, supra note 365, at 540-41 (arguing text alone is not best guide to
statutory meaning); Mank, Textualist Approach, supra note 307, at 1267-78 (considering legislative
history leads to better understanding of statutory meaning).
378. See Mank, Textualist Approach, supra note 307, at 1278-90.
379. ESKRIDGE, supra note 367, at 120.
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Faithful to his approach to statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion focused on the meaning of the statute's text in light of the common
meaning of the words in a dictionary. 380 He arrogantly assumed that he could
find the Act's meaning in this way and dismissed the possibility that the text was
ambiguous enough to justify the Corps' interpretation.38I
Commentators have identified Justices Stevens and Breyer as the current
justices most identified with a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. 382
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion focused
on the Act's underlying purposes and that Justice Breyer joined that opinion. 383
Based on the Act's broad purposes and Congress' intent to give the Corps wide
discretion to achieve those purposes, Justices Stevens's dissenting opinion
argued that the Corps' wetlands regulations were justified in claiming
jurisdiction over all tributary wetlands. 384
In 1994, Professor Eskridge characterized Justice Kennedy's approach to
statutory interpretation as "lenient textualism."385 Compared to Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy is more willing to consider legislative history and other factors
besides a statute's text. 386 In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy recognized that the Court
could not find the precise intent of the Congress that enacted the 1972 Act in
using the terms "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" to describe
the Act's jurisdiction because those words do not provide the type of clear
definition that was possible when the United States regulated only actually
navigable waters. Although the scope of the Act's jurisdiction is not precise, he
argued, however, that the Act's use of the term "navigable waters" limited its
jurisdictional scope to waters having a "significant nexus" to navigable waters
and that the Corps' regulations were deficient because they did not demonstrate
the existence of such a nexus for all the wetlands that it regulated. 387 Because it
was not possible to ascertain the precise intent of Congress as to which waters
are covered by the Act, he interpreted the term "significant nexus" in light of the
Act's broad ecological purposes. 388 Justice Kennedy's approach was closer on
the whole to Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion because both focused on the
statute's purposes more than its ambiguous text, although they did not agree on

380. See generally supra notes 364-79 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 364-79 and accompanying text.
382. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,428-29 (1998) (interpreting statute
in light of its purpose); Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (same); John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1,3 nA (2001) (stating Justices
Stevens and Breyer often take a purposivist approach).
383. See supra notes 195-31 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 195-31 and accompanying text.
385. ESKRIDGE, supra note 367, at 120.
386. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 nA, 6lO-12 (1991) (considering
legislative history); Mank, Context, supra note 368, at 826.
387. United States v. Rapanos, 1265 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also supra notes 263-77 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 269, 277 and accompanying text.
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the amount of deference owed to the Corps' interpretation.
N. THE FuTuRE

A. How Will the Lower Courts Apply Rapanos?
1. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Company.-In late June 2006, shortly
after the Rapanos decision, in United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 389 the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas criticized the "significant nexus"
test in Rapanos as failing to provide guidance because the test was "vague" and
"subjective.,,39o Instead, the district court followed the Fifth Circuit's prior
precedent giving a narrow interpretation of the scope of the Act in an opinion
that was closer to the plurality opinion than Justice Kennedy's opinion. The
court held the defendant Chevron Pipe Line Company is not subject to CWA or
Oil Pollution Act (OPA)391 civil penalties that the U.S. Government sought to
impose for an oil spill into the dry channel of an intermittent stream because the
waters in question did not have a significant nexus with navigable waters subject
to jurisdiction under the statutes. 392 The streams were dry at the time that a
leaking Chevron pipeline spilled 3000 barrels of crude oil into an unnamed
intermittent channel/tributary that is usually dry unless there is a significant
rainfall event. 393 The unnamed channel/tributary joins the intermittent Ennis
Creek, which is dry unless there is rainfall, approximately 500 feet from the
location of the spill; Ennis Creek then flows 17.5 river miles into the intermittent
Rough Creek, which creek flows 23.8 river miles to its confluence with the
Double Mountain Fork of the Brazos River.394
U.S. District Judge Cummings stated that the Supreme Court's decision in
Rapanos had "failed to reach a consensus of a majority as to the jurisdictional
boundary of the CWA."395 He observed, "Justice Kennedy wrote his own
concurring opinion and advanced an ambiguous test-whether a 'significant
nexus' exists to waters that are/were/might be navigable. ,,396 The district court
criticized the test as unworkable. "This test leaves no guidance on how to
implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is 'significant'
and how is a 'nexus' determined?"397 By contrast, Judge Cummings discussed
the plurality opinion's view that "the waters of the United States" as including

389. 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
390. ld. at 613.
391. The OPA's jurisdiction is defined by the same "navigable waters" standard as the Clean
Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21) (2000) (defining "navigable waters" as "the waters of the
United States, including the territorial sea").
392. Chevron Pipe, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 608-15.
393. ld. at 607.
394. ld. at 608.
395. ld. at 613.
396. ld.
397. ld.
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only relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
without any criticism, unlike his critical evaluation of Justice Kennedy's
"significant nexus" test. The district court stated, "the plurality looked to the
statutory wording of the CW A and gave it its plain and literal meaning-a
constructionist viewpoint." 398
Judge Cummings concluded, "[b]ecause Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate
on the 'significant nexus' required, this Court will look to the prior reasoning in
this circuit."399 In In re Needham,4°O the Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he CWA and
the OPA are not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose
regulations over 'tributaries' that are neither themselves navigable nor truly
adjacent to navigable waters.,,401 In deciding whether an oil spill affected
"navigable waters," the Needham court concluded, "the proper inquiry is whether
... the site of the farthest traverse of the spill, is navigable-in-fact or adjacent to
an open body of navigable water. ,,402 Although the district court did not mention
this statement, the Needham court had also stated, "the term 'adjacent' cannot
include every possible source of water that eventually flows into a navigable-infact waterway. Rather, adjacency necessarily implicates a 'significant nexus'
between the water in question and the navigable-in-fact waterway.,,403 The
district court in Chevron Pipe determined, "as a matter of law in this circuit, the
connection of generally dry channels and creek beds will not suffice to create a
'significant nexus' to a navigable water simply because one feeds into the next
during the rare times of actual flow.,,404 The district court's and presumably the
Fifth Circuit's approach is closer to the Rapanos plurality opinion than Justice
Kennedy's opinion.
Following Needham and the Rapanos plurality opinion, the district court
found that the intermittent streams at issue in its case were not within the
jurisdiction of the CWA or OPA. 405 Addressing Chevron's motion for summary
judgment, the court stated "this Court must look to see if there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the farthest traverse of the spill is a navigable-infact water or adjacent to an open body of navigable water.,,406 The government
argued that during an average month there would be enough rain to cause the oil
deposited in the intermittent stream to flow into the Brazos River. 407 The court
rejected this "speculation" as failing to show "whether any oil from the spill
actually reached 'the navigable waters of the United States'-as that term is

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

[d.
[d.

354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003).
[d. at 345.
[d. at 346 (emphasis added).
[d. at 347.

Chevron Pipe. 437 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
[d. at 613-15.
[d. at 613.
[d. at 614-15.
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defined in Needham or in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Rapanos. ,,408
The district court treated the Needham opinion and Rapanos plurality opinion as
the operative law rather than Justice Kennedy's opinion. The court did refer to
the "significant nexus" test in finding that the stream was not within the
jurisdiction of the OPA or CWA, but it defined that nexus in light of the Fifth
Circuit's approach to the jurisdiction of the two statutes. "Thus, absent actual
evidence that the site of the farthest traverse of the spill is navigable-in-fact or
adjacent to an open body of navigable water, the Court finds that a 'significant
nexus' is not present under the law of this circuit.,,409
Because Chevron argued that there had been no rain at the time of the spill
and the government produced no evidence of any rainfall, the district court
granted Chevron's motion for summary judgment.41o In its conclusion, the court
emphasized the Rapanos plurality opinion, stating, "based upon the arguments
contained in Chevron's Brief . . . as well as the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
contained in In re Needham and the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in
Rapanos v. United States, this Court finds that the subject discharge of oil did not
reach navigable waters of the United States.,,411 In a footnote, the court
"conclude[d] that the United States has failed to establish a 'significant nexus'
with competent summary judgment evidence.,,412
The district court relied more on the plurality opinion than Justice Kennedy's
significant nexus test. Indeed, the court dismissed the significant nexus test as
unworkable. The court implied that the Fifth Circuit's Needham opinion was
closer to the plurality opinion
The Chevron Pipe decision may have little influence in other circuits that do
not have the Fifth Circuit's unique history of narrowly construing the Act. For
example, the Tenth Circuit in Hubenka explicitly disagreed with the Fifth
Circuit's approach, stating, "The Supreme Court's opinion in SWANCC does not
compel such a narrow interpretation of the phrase 'significant nexus. ",413 The
First Circuit has also explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach.414 As is
discussed in the next section, the law in other circuits is also inconsistent with the
Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Act.
2. The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits Will Likely
Follow Justice Kennedy's Approach.-Citing Marks, the Ninth Circuit in
Healdsburg stated that "Justice Kennedy, constituting the fifth vote for reversal,
concurred only in the judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of
law.,,415 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Gerke also cited Marks in concluding

at 614.
at 615 (emphasis in original).
at 614-15.
at 615.
at 615 n.15.
413. United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1033-34 (lOth Cir. 2006).
414. United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 170n.16 (lstCir. 2006), vacated and remanded,
No. 05-1444, 2006 WL 3072145 (1st Cir. Oct. 31, 2006).
415. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006). The
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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that Justice Kennedy's test should be followed except in the rare case when the
plurality's approach would give greater federal jurisdiction under the CWA. 416
Based on past precedent, the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits will also
more likely follow Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test rather than the
plurality opinion because these circuits had limited SWANCC to its facts and
allowed the Corps to regulate tributary wetlands or similar wetlands if there is
any hydrological connection between them and navigable waters. 417 For
example, in Deaton, the Fourth Circuit found a sufficient hydrological
connection between wetlands adjacent to a manmade ditch that flowed over
several miles into tributaries that eventually reached a navigable river.4I8
The Deaton court's approach of approving the Corps broad regulation of
wetlands next to nonnavigable tributaries has been adopted in the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits and has also strongly influenced decisions in the First and Seventh
Circuits.4I9 Citing Deaton, the Sixth Circuit in Rapanos found jurisdictional
wetlands even though water from them had to travel twenty miles to reach
navigable waters and in Carabell the Circuit found jurisdiction over wetlands

Healdsburg court also stated that Rapanos had narrowed Riverside Bayview by requiring the
Government to prove that even wetlands adjacent to a navigable river have a "significant nexus"
with that river. [d. at 1030. That conclusion is a misreading of Rapanos, which did not change
Riverside Bayview's holding that wetlands adjacent to a navigable river are always within the Act's
jurisdiction. E-mail from Jonathan H. Adler to envlawprofessors (Aug. 11,2006) (on file with
author); E-mail from Steve Johnson, toenvlawprofessors (Aug. 11 ,2006) (on file with author).
416. United States v. Gerke, 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
417. Before Rapanos, six of the circuit courts of appeal limited SWANCC to its facts and read
the Act's jurisdiction broadly to include wetlands near non-navigable waters that eventually flow
into navigable waters. See, e.g., Hubenka, 438 F.3d at 1033-34; Johnson, 437 F.3d at 170, 175,
180-81 (allowing Corps to regulate wetlands on cranberry farm); United States v. Gerke, 412 F.3d
804 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2964 (2006), modified 464 F.3d 723 (7th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and
remanded 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable drainage ditch, which is
eventual tributary to navigable waters); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526,
528-34 (9th Cir. 2001); Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean
Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 132-34 (2003) (''The emerging majority rule among the
federal courts and EPA AUs is that any surface water connection to waters that are navigable in
the traditional sense-however intermittent, convoluted, or human-made the connection might
be-is sufficient to conferCWAjurisdiction over a water body."); Mank, supra note 4, at 866-79
(discussing cases reading SWANCC narrowly and Clean Water Act broadly).
418. See Deaton, 332 F.3d at 702.
419. See Hubenka, 438 F.3d at 1034; United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir.
2003); see also Johnson, 437 F.3d at 169-81; Gerke, 412 F.3d at 807 ("Whether the wetlands are
100 miles from a navigable waterway or 6 feet, if water from the wetlands enters a stream that flows
into the navigable waterway, the wetlands are 'waters of the United States' within the meaning of
the Act."); Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 450-53; Deaton, 332 F.3d at 704-12.
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that are usually separated from hydrological waters by a berm.420 In Hubenka,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps had jurisdiction over the defendants'
filling and building dikes in the nonnavigable tributary of a navigable river.421
In Gerke, the Seventh Circuit held that the Corps had jurisdiction over wetlands
next to a nonnavigable man-made ditch that "runs into a nonnavigable creek that
runs into the nonnavigable Lemonweir River, which in turn runs into the
Wisconsin River, which is navigable."422 Stating that Deaton "provides helpful
methodological and substantive guidance,"423 the First Circuit in Johnson held
the Corps had jurisdiction over wetlands that are located near cranberry bogs on
a farm because the wetlands are hydrologically connected to the navigable
Weweantic River through nonnavigable tributaries, but the First Circuit vacated
this decision in the wake of Rapanos and remanded the case to the district
court. 424
Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, sharply disagreed with cases adopting
the mere hydrological connection approach because many of the "tributaries" are
intermittent, stating:
Even after SWANCC, the lower courts have continued to uphold the
Corps' sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and
drains as "tributaries." For example, courts have held that jurisdictional
"tributaries" include the "intermittent flow of surface water through
approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches
(paralleling and crossing under 1-64)," Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344
F.3d 407, 410 (C.A.4 2003); a "roadside ditch" whose water took "a
winding, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake Bay," United States v.
Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (C.A.4 2003); irrigation ditches and drains
that intermittently connect to covered waters, Community Assn. for
Restoration of Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954955 (C.A.9 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
526,534 (C.A.9 2001); and (most implausibly of all) the "washes and
arroyos" of an "arid development site," located in the middle of the
desert, through which "water courses ... during periods of heavy rain,"
Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (C.A.9
2005).425
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have already endorsed Justice Kennedy's
"significant nexus" test as the standard for determining federal j urisdiction under
the CWA, except in the rare case where the plurality's approach would provide
greater jurisdiction. 426 In light of their prior precedent broadly interpreting the

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

See supra notes 239-40, 287-90 and accompanying text.
Hubenka, 438 F.3d at 1034-36.
Gerke, 412 F.3d at 805-08.
Johnson, 437 F.3d at 170.
[d. at 160-64, 169-81.
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2217-18 (2006).
See supra notes 415-16 and accompanying text.
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Act's jurisdiction over tributaries, the First, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits are
more likely to follow Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test rather than the
plurality opinion's approach.427
B. Will the Corps Issue New Regulations?

On July 5, 2006, the Corps regulatory branch chief Mark Sudol sent via email an "interim guidance" to Corps district officials stating that the Corps and
EPA planned to issue joint guidance "in the near future" that would clarify the
Agencies' CWA jurisdiction to make it consistent with Rapanos.428 The Sudol
guidance stated that the Agencies may
make some changes in how we describe and document the justifications
that underlie some of our CWA jurisdictional determinations (JDs). In
other words, the tests that we cite and the facts that we document in
some of our JD administrative records will probably change somewhat,
to insure that our JDs reflect the Supreme Court's most recent legal tests
for asserting CWA jurisdiction. 429
This language suggests that the Agencies may make only moderate changes to
justify how they currently make CWA jurisdictional determinations rather than
the sweeping changes limiting their jurisdiction that Justice Scalia would
prefer.430 The Sudol guidance asked Corps personnel not to take any public
position "in court pleadings or in any sort of dealings with outside parties" on the
scope of CWA jurisdiction until the agencies issued their joint guidance. 431 Ann
Klee, then general counsel for the EPA, similarly urged EPA attorneys not to use
Rapanos in their pleadings until the Agencies issue new guidance "in the near
future.,,432 The Sudol guidance also asked staff to restrict their enforcement
actions and permit authorizations to traditional navigable waters unless they
receive authorization from headquarters. 433
On August 1, 2006, before a Senate subcommittee hearing on Rapanos,

427. See supra notes 417-24 and accompanying text.
428. Memorandum from Mark Sudol to Various Army Corps Staff, Interim Guidance on the
Rapanos and Carabell Supreme Court Decision (July 5, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Sudol Memorandum]; Amena H. Saiyid, Corps of Engineers, EPA Preparing Guidance In Wake
of u.s. Supreme Court Decision, 37 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1520 (2006) (discussing Sudol "interim
guidance").
429. Sudol Memorandum, supra note 428, at l.
430. Matt Shipman, Memo Hints At Limited EPA, Corps Clean Water Changes After Rapanos
Ruling, INSIDE EPA, June 10, 2006, available at http://www.aswm.orglwbnlepa_rapanos_memo.
pdf.
431. Sudol Memorandum, supra note 428, at 1-2.
432. Andrew S. Neal, Federal Lawyers Discuss Development of Law After Supreme Court
Decision in Rapanos, 37 ENV'TREp. (BNA) 1521 (2006) (quoting Ann K1ee, general counsel for
the EPA).
433. Sudol Memorandum, supra note 428, at 2-3.
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Benjamin Grumbles, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water, and Army
Assistant Secretary for Civil Works John Paul Woodley, Jr. presented a joint
written statement that the Agencies were "working quickly" to issue joint interim
guidance in the near future to address the CWAjurisdictional issues raised by the
decision and might issue additional guidance if it were needed to refine the
guidance. 434 Grumbles stated that "[ w]e have no schedule, but we expect to issue
[the guidance] as soon as possible.,,435 Woodley stated that the guidance would
address how to apply the "significant nexus" standard. 436 In response to Sen.
Lisa Murkowski' s (R-AK) request that the Agencies issue new regulations, rather
than unenforceable guidance, Grumbles and John C. Cruden, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division, replied
that the agencies were considering regulations, but that issuing guidance would
take less time and, therefore, would provide regulatory clarity sooner than issuing
regulations. 437
On September 26, 2006, the Corps published in the Federal Register a
proposal to reissue and modify its nationwide wetland permits ("NWPs")
beginning in 2007 and solicited public comment on the proposal.438 The proposal
briefly observed that the Supreme Court's Rapanos decision raised questions
about its jurisdiction over wetlands that would be addressed on a case-by-case
basis by the DOJ and by any future guidance issued by the DOJ and other
agencies. 439 Implicitly rejecting the "permanent stream" approach of the plurality
opinion, the Corps stated that "[ w]e are proposing to provide greater protection
for ephemeral streams" by applying the 300 linear foot limit for loss of stream
bed to ephemeral streams; the 2002 NWPs applied the 300 linear foot limit only
to perennial and intermittent stream beds. 440 The Corps proposed expansion of
its jurisdiction in the proposed 2007 NWPs program suggests that the
forthcoming guidance on wetlands jurisdiction may also take an expansive view
of that jurisdiction.

434. Hearing Concerning Recent Supreme Court Decisions Dealing with the Clean Water Act
Before the S. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water of the S. Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 109th Congo 13-14 (2006) (statement of Benjamin Grumbles, EPA Assistant
Administrator for Water, and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Army Assistant Secretary for Civil Works).
435. Amena H. Saiyid, EPA, Corps of Engineers to Issue Guidance on Rapanos Decision 'As
Soon as Possible,' 37 ENV'TREp. (BNA) 1626 (Aug. 4, 2006).
436. DOJ Planfor Dual Wetlands Jurisdiction Test Wins Cautious Backing, INSIDE THE EPA
(Aug. 4, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 13395727, at *4 [hereinafter DOJ Plan for Dual
Wetlands Jurisdiction].
437. Id.
438. Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 71 Fed. Reg. 56,258 (Sept. 26,
2006).
439. /d. at 56,261.
440. Id.
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C. The Department of Justice Adopts Justices Stevens's Approach
of Following Either the Plurality or Justice Kennedy's Concurrence

In its Motion for Remand in the Rapanos case, the DOJ agreed with Justice
Stevens's dual approach that the government should have jurisdiction over
wetlands if the wetlands at issue meet either the plurality's test or Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" standard because the four dissenting justices
would have affirmed the government's jurisdiction and, hence, only one
additional vote is needed for the government to prevail. 441 The Motion stated:

When no majority opinion exists in a decision of the Supreme Court,
controlling legal principles may derive from those principles espoused
by five Justices. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94
(1977); cf. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006). Thus,
regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA) exists over a
wetland if either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied. 126
S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).442
In a lengthy and thoughtful opinion addressing the meaning of Marks, the First
Circuit in Johnson adopted Justice Stevens's dual approach; a Florida federal
district court has also endorsed his dual approach.443
There is likely to be criticism of the DOJ's dual standard approach. Some
environmentalists are unhappy with the dual standard because they believe that
it will sow confusion in the lower courtS.444 Professor Adler interprets Marks as
only authorizing lower courts to consider a plurality opinion and concurring
opinions, but not dissenting opinions.445
In Marks, the Court stated, "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.,,446 There is disagreement
about how to apply the Marks rule when the plurality and concurring opinions
differ substantially.447 In fact, the Court has acknowledged that it and lower
courts in some cases have struggled to apply Marks. 448

441. Motion for Remand to the District Court for Further Proceedings Regarding Regulatory
Jurisdiction, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Rapanos,
No. 03-1489 (July 31, 2006), at 3 (on file with author).
442. Id.
443. See United States v. Johnson, No. 05-1444, 2006 WL 3072145, at *6-20 (1st Cir. Oct.
31,2006); see also United States v. Evans, No. 3:05CRI59J32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
444. DOJ Plan for Dual Wetlands Jurisdiction, supra note 436.
445. See infra notes 457-60 and accompanying text.
446. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977); see also Posting of Amy Howe to
SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com (June 19,200613:30 EST) (quoting Richard Lazarus).
447. See infra notes 448-67 and accompanying text.
448. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); see also Nichols v. United States, 511
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Some argue that the Marks case should not apply to a case like Rapanos
because there is little overlap and hence no "common denominator" between the
concurring and plurality opinions. 449 The Chevron Pipe decision did not cite
Marks, but it stated that "the Supreme Court [in Rapanos] failed to reach a
consensus of a majority as to the jurisdictional boundary of the CWA.,,450 The
Ninth Circuit in Healdsburg, however, assumed that the Marks rule applied to
Justice Kennedy's opinion because it "constitute[ed] the fifth vote for reversal,
concurred only in the judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of
law.,,45I Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Gerke also cited Marks and considered
the votes of the four dissentingjustices in concluding that Justice Kennedy's test
should be followed except in the rare case when the plurality's approach would
give greater federal jurisdiction under the CWA. 452 Additionally, a Florida
federal district court found that there was no common denominator between the
plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos and hence no "rule"
under Marks, but it still endorsed Justice Stevens's dual approach. 453
Additionally, some lower courts consider not just the overlap between the
concurring and the plurality opinions, but also examine other concurring or
dissenting opinions. 454 These lower courts seek to find an "implicit agreement"
or a "common denominator" between opinions.455 Under that approach, lower
courts could consider the substantial overlap between Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion and the Stevens dissent. The Seventh Circuit in Gerke
explicitly considered the votes of the four dissenting justices in concluding that
Justice Kennedy's test should be followed except in the rare case when the
plurality's approach would give greater federal jurisdiction under the CWA. 456
In a statement presented at the August 1, 2006 Senate subcommittee hearing

U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994).
449. Posting of Hans Bader to SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com (June 19,2006
14:00 EST) (arguing Marks is inapplicable because Kennedy and the plurality opinion do not
"share a common denominator in their approach to deciding the case").
450. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605,613 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
451. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).
452. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006).
453. See United States v. Evans, No. 3:05CRI59J32HTS, 2006 WL2221629 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
2,2006).
454. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Housing, 247 F.3d 397,418-19 (2dCir. 2001); Breyer
v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000); ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 103-04 (3d
Cir. 1999); Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1997); Tyler v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1992); see E-mail from Richard Lazarus to
ENVLAWPROFESSORS (listserv of environmental law professors, moderated by Professor John
Bonine University of Oregon, Bowerman Environmental Law Center) (June 20, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Lazarus E-Mail].
455. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential
Value o/Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKEL.J.419, 428-29 (1992); see Lazarus E-mail,
supra note 454.
456. 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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on Rapanos, Professor Adler interpreted the Marks decision to require lower
courts to follow those portions of the Rapanos decision where the plurality
opinion and Justice Kennedy agree and to forbid lower courts from considering
the dissenting opinion. 457 He argued that the plurality opinion and Justice
Kennedy's opinion agreed that the Act's jurisdiction is limited by the term
"navigable waters" and that the Corps' current regulations are too broad and that
those points of agreement are the only binding portions of Rapanos under the
Marks' framework. 458 Because nothing in a dissenting opinion is part of the
judgment of the court or is legally binding, Adler argues that nothing in a dissent
can be part of the Court's holding under the Marks rule that the holding of a
fragmented Court can be found within the opinions of "those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.,,459 Accordingly, he
concludes that lower courts may not treat those areas where Justice Stevens's
dissent agrees with Justice Kennedy's opinion as a '"holding''' of the Court.460
Professor Buzbee, by contrast, argues that Marks allows lower courts to
consider the numerous points upon which the dissenting opinion and Justice
Kennedy's opinion form a five vote majority.461 Professor Buzbee contends that
Justice Kennedy's opinion agrees far more with the dissenting opinion than with
the plurality opinion. 462 This Article comes to the same conclusion. 463 Because
Justice Kennedy's opinion coincides more with the dissenting opinion, Professor
Buzbee reasons that it is appropriate to treat these two opinions as the majority
of the Court under the Marks standard. He states:
In the United States judicial system, five aligned votes by Supreme Court
justices make a binding precedent. As indicated by the brief concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, if the Court is splintered, the narrowest
opinion, here Justice Kennedy's, would be the key. As the Chief Justice
states through his citation to Marks v. Whitney, the question is whether
a "single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices." Here, Justice Kennedy's concurring Rapanos opinion shares
substantial overlap with the dissenters' approaches. The dissenters
would have deferred even more than Justice Kennedy to regulators'
judgments, but in all parts of their opinion, the dissenters would protect
waters at least to the extent set forth by Justice Kennedy. They

457. Hearing Concerning Recent Supreme Court Decisions Dealing with the Clean Water Act
Before the S. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water of the S. Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 109th Congo 4-5 (2006) (written statement of Jonathan H. Alder, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Environment and Natural Resources Division), available at http://epw.senate.
govl 109thlAdler_Testimony.pdf.
458. [d. at 5.
459. [d.
460. [d.
461. Buzbee Statement, supra note 25, at 4-5.
462. [d.
463. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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repeatedly and explicitly agree with the rationales for federal protection
set forth in the Justice Kennedy concurrence. Whether taken by itself as
the "narrowest opinion," or as an opinion with underlying rationales
agreed upon by five justices, Justice Kennedy's opinion is the key.464
In a lengthy and thoughtful opinion addressing the meaning of Marks, the
First Circuit in Johnson acknowledged that the Marks "narrowest grounds" test
"does not translate easily" to the Rapanos case because the "cases in which
Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not a subset of the cases in
which the plurality would limit jurisdiction."465 The Johnson decision argued
that "the Supreme Court itself has moved away from the Marks formula" because
subsequent Supreme Court decisions had acknowledged that the Marks test was
difficult to apply and that several members of the Court had considered
dissenting opinions in determining what is the opinion of a fragmented Court. 466
Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that Justice Stevens's approach was the
best way to determine the opinion of the Rapanos court even if it was
inconsistent with the Marks test because Stevens's view

is consistent with the direction that the Court as a whole has taken since
Marks. Moreover, the fact that Justice Stevens does not even refer to
Marks indicates that he found its framework inapplicable to the
interpretation by the lower courts of the divergent tests laid out by the
opinions in Rapanos.467
The Johnson decision's view that the Marks test does not apply to the Rapanos
opinions is sound and provides the best rationale for adopting Justice Stevens's
dual approach.
The DOJ Motion also cited, "cf." a Supreme Court case decided the week
after Rapanos as supporting the view that lower courts may examine all opinions
of the Court to determine which view commands a working majority of five. In
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LUIAC),468 which involved
a challenge to the Texas state legislature's 2003 changes to the state's
congressional district boundaries, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion,
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer with respect
to Parts II-A and Ill; an opinion with respect to Parts I and IV, which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined; and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B
and II-C and Part II-D, which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburgjoined. 469 In
remarks at a conference, Ann Klee, then the EPA General Counsel, suggested
that the LUIAC decision implies a more flexible approach than Marks's
"narrowest grounds" approach and instead finds a majority whenever five

464. Buzbee Statement, supra note 25, at 5.
465. United States v. Johnson, No. 05-1444, 2006 WL3072145, at *7 (lstCir. Oct. 31, 2006).
466. [d. at *9.
467. [d.

468. 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2604 (2006).
469. [d.
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justices agree on a particular issue even if another set of five justices constitute
a majority on other issues. 47o The DO] Motion, however, cites Marks as the
primary support for its dual opinion standard and cites LULAC only
tangentially.471 Because LULAC did not directly address the issue of which Court
opinions are binding, Marks remains the Court's most important decision on
which opinions of a fragmented court are binding on lower courts.

D. Will Congress Pass Legislation?
Congress could pass legislation to resolve the Act's jurisdiction, which it
commonly did during the 1970s and 1980s, but since the 1990s it has become
more difficult to enact environmental legislation in an increasingly partisan
Congress where there is a growing divide between liberal Democrats and
conservative Republicans.472 Even during the less partisan 1970s and 1980s,
Congress was unable to agree on legislation to clarify the Act's jurisdiction. In
1977, Congress considered several bills to clarify the Act's jurisdiction, but in
the end did not pass any jurisdictional amendments. 473 In 1987, Congress made
several significant Amendments to the Act, but did not resolve jurisdictional
issues. 474
In 2005, Democrat Senator Russell Feingold, along with 15 co-sponsoring
Democratic Senators, proposed legislation, entitled "The Clean Water Authority
Restoration Act of 2005," that would have expanded the Act's jurisdiction to
reach to "all waters" that are "subject to the legislative power of Congress under
the Constitution" and would strike the term "navigable waters of the United
States" in the current statute and replace it with the term "waters of the United
States."475 A similar bill was proposed in the House by Representatives Oberstar
(D-MN), Leach (R-IA) , Dingell (D-MI) and Boehlert (R-NY) and 155 other
House members. 476 Many Democrats and environmentalists support the Feingold

470. Texas Redistricting Case Could Complicate High Court Wetlands Ruling,

INSIDE THE

EPA, July 28,2006 (reporting remarks of EPA General Counsel Ann Klee at July 18 forum on
Rapanos hosted by the Washington Legal Foundation), available at 2006 WLNR 12952674. Ms.
Klee subsequently resigned as EPA General Counsel.
471. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
472. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy
in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 668-74 (2006) (presenting data compiled by the League
of Conservation Voters from 1971 until 2004 showing Republicans and Democrats increasingly
disagree on environmental issues).
473. Mank, supra note 4, at 836.
474. See Water Quality Actofl987, Pub. L. No. 100-4,101 Stat. 7-90 (1987); Lazarus, supra
note 472, at 628-29.
475. Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005, S. 912, 109th Congo §§ 4(23), 5(1)-(3)
(1st Sess. 2005) (introduced Apr. 27, 2005 and referred to the Committee on Environment and
Public Works) (amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify the jurisdiction of the
United States over waters of the United States).
476. Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of2005, H.R. 1356, 109th Congo (1 st Sess. 2005)
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legislation. 477 Most Republican legislators prefer to wait before considering any
legislative changes until after the Bush Administration has time to issue
clarifying regulations. 478 By the time the Agencies issue clarifying regulations,
many legislators up for reelection will probably have turned their attention to the
November 2006 elections and, therefore, any legislative changes to the Act will
more likely come in 2007, if at all.
CONCLUSION

The Rapanos decision will likely require the Corps to issue new regulations
or guidance that more carefully justify its regulation of tributary wetlands, but it
is not a revolutionary decision and will not undermine the Corps' current practice
of broadly enforcing the Act. The plurality opinion would have drastically
limited the scope of the Act by limiting the definition of "waters of the United
States" to permanently flowing waters and wetlands that have a physical surface
water connection with those waters. 479 A fundamental flaw with the plurality
opinion is its excessive reliance on dictionary definitions and textualist
methodology to the exclusion of the Act's ecological goals. 480 Thus, the
plurality would exclude many significant intermittent streams from the Act's
jurisdiction even though they playa significant role in affecting hydrology and
ecology in many areas, especially the western areas of the United States. The
plurality harshly criticizes the expense of Corps regulations without giving any
weight to the value of the wetland resources they protect. 481 It is fortunate for
the nation's wetlands that the plurality could not command a majority.
The dissenting opinion appropriately emphasized the Act's ecological
purposes in interpreting the statute. Because Congress gave the Agencies broad
discretion to fulfill the Act's purposes, the dissenting opinion gave great
deference to the Corps' existing regulations, which Republican and Democratic
Administrations had supported for thirty years. 482 The dissent failed, however,
to acknowledge SWANCC' s underlying philosophy that a connection to navigable
waters still has some importance in defining the Act's jurisdiction. 483 Probably
because all of the Rapanos dissenters had dissented in SWANCC, they were
reluctant to give the latter decision the precedential weight it deserved. 484
Justice Kennedy appropriately took a middle position that was closer to the

(introduced Mar. 17, 2005) (amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify the
Jurisdiction of the United States over Waters of the United States).
477. Chafee Signals He May Side with Environmentalists on Water Act Scope, INSIDE THE
EPA, July 21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12482643.
478. [d.
479. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 195, 224 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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purposivist dissenting opinion than the textualist plurality opinion. In the areas
of national power and federalism, Justice Kennedy has taken a centrist position
that seeks a middle ground between Justice Scalia's states right's philosophy and
Justice Stevens's support for broad national power. 485 Based upon SWANCC's
underlying philosophy that a connection to navigable waters still has some
importance in defining the Act's jurisdiction, he used the term "significant
nexus" found in one sentence of the case explaining the Court's earlier Riverside
Bayview decision and made it the cornerstone of a new test for which waters and
wetlands are sufficiently connected with navigable waters to come within the
Act's jurisdiction. 486 His choice of the "significant nexus" language as the basis
for his new jurisdictional test is reasonable because commentators and several
lower courts had recognized that it provided the best test for applying the Court's
precedent in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC to cases involving tributary
wetlands. 487
In the end, Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test will likely only modestly
limit the scope of the Act because he emphasizes ecological considerations in
applying his standard. 488 As the dissent predicts and the plurality acknowledges
is a substantial possibility, the Corps will likely be able to issue regulations or
guidance based on the significant nexus test that allow it to regulate most of the
wetlands that fall within its current regulations because most tributary wetlands
have significant ecological or hydrological impacts on navigable waters. 489
Justice Kennedy could have defined the significant nexus test more narrowly to
address only hydrological connections, but he adopted a broader definition in
light of the Act's broad ecological goals. 490
In the short term, before the Agencies issue new guidance or regulations,
there is likely to be some confusion and disagreement in the lower courts on how
to apply the significant nexus test. 491 As the Texas District Court decision in
Chevron Pipe demonstrates, the impact of the decision will vary somewhat from
circuit to circuit based in large part upon how the various circuit courts of appeal
had reacted to SWANCc. 492 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have already
endorsed Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test as the standard for
determining federal jurisdiction under the CWA, except in the rare case where
the plurality's approach would provide greater jurisdiction. 493 In light of their
prior precedent broadly interpreting the Act's jurisdiction over tributaries, the
First, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits are more likely to follow Justice
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Kennedy's "significant nexus" test rather than the plurality opinion's approach. 494
Based on past precedent, more circuits are likely to follow Justice Kennedy's test
than the plurality'S standard.
The Corps has recognized that it needs to issue at least interim guidance in
the near future to assure more consistent resolution of jurisdictional issues. 495
The Corps should consider issuing detailed regulations to clarify any issues not
resolved by its new guidance. It is less likely that Congress will be able to
achieve sufficient consensus to pass legislation defining the Act's jurisdiction. 496

494. See supra notes 417-24 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 428-37, 439 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 472-78 and accompanying text.

